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ABSTRACT 
Tiltrotor technology has been proven mature and technically feasible through 
well over 40 years of Government research and development, and three generations 
of tiltrotor aircraft. The Defense Department is moving forward with development 
of the MV-22 Osprey and should reach a full rate production decision in the near 
future. Despite a lucrative market for civil applications of tiltrotor technology, as of 
1996, there has been no firm commitment to develop a civil tiltrotor (CTR). The 
pwpose of this thesis was to examine whether Defense development and procurement 
of the MV-22 Osprey is a prerequisite to commercial development of a tiltrotor. This 
thesis focused on the barriers to introducing the CTR, and how Government efforts 
and the MV-22 have been influential in overcoming those barriers. There are two 
principal fmdings. First, tiltrotor technology has progressed to the point where CTR 
applications are dependent on the MV-22, only to the extent that without the benefit 
ofMV-22 production, demonstration, and operational experience, the CTR's arrival 
will be significantly delayed. Second, technology is not the most critical 
consideration. The most critical barrier to successful fielding of a CTR, is a systems 
integration problem, primarily centered around the lack of a supporting infrastructure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bell Helicopters and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
helped pioneer tiltrotor technology as far back as the mid-1950s, beginning with the XV-3, 
a developmental prototype. Years later the two organizations developed the XV-15, which 
captivated audiences in attendance at the Paris Air Show during its public debut in 1981. 
[Ref.1] Since then, literally thousands of potential investors and aviation industry leaders 
have observed this advanced technology demonstration. Tttey have been awed by its 
capabilities, and enticed by its promising potential for employment across the entire 
spectrum of military and civil markets. [Ref.1] 
It may be asked: Why is this unique aviation concept that combines the capabilities 
and advantages of a helicopter, with those of a fixed-wing turboprop aircraft, so 
significant? [Ref.2:p.vii]. As Congressman Pete Geren, a Representative from Texas 
pointed out in testimony before Congress: 
The versatility and maneuverability of this innovative aircraft make it 
ideally suited for so many missions, for which traditional helicopters or 
airplanes are impractical. Some of these missions will include new uses for 
the military special operations drug interdiction, disaster relief, firefighting, 
medical evacuation, commercial delivery services, and civil transportation. 
[Ref.1 :p. 7] 
Furthermore, as described by Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon, in an 
interview with the researcher: 
From the standpoint of our industrial base, its the first really new 
technology that looks like its going to be built completely in the U.S. 
Which I think is a major moral win for America, and why I labeled it 
America's airplane a few years ago. It was given the Collier Award as the 
1 
most significant breakthrough in technology. Its going to mean tens of 
thousands of manufacturing jobs, and is going to allow us to maintain the 
lead in the one area we have dominated the world, and that's aviation 
products ... In a time where we're loosing our industrial base, and our 
manufacturing jobs are going offshore left and right, here's one thing that 
can serve as a remainder that America is still the leader in manufacturing. 
The tiltrotor could be an example of that. [Ref.3] 
For quite some time, there has been an urgent need for the Marine Corps to replace 
its fleet of approximately 300 CH-46E Helicopters. This sense of urgency may be 
associated more with the aircraft's age and deteriorating condition, as opposed to changes 
in the threat or mission requirements. Though the aircraft's condition may now be the 
driving factor for finding an alternative, this is not the only reason [Ref. I]. 
The CH-46E's primary role is troop transport, and it satisfies the Marine Corps' 
medium lift requirement. Medium lift is a central aspect of the Marine Corps' assault 
support mission. Of critical concern to the Marine Corps, is how it will satisfy an 
increased assault support requirement, as part of a new and improved amphibious assault 
capability. This capability is to be the cornerstone of the Marine Corps' future contribution 
to the Navy's "Forward from the Sea" strategy. [Ref. I] 
For nearly twenty years the Marine Corps has championed the notion that the 
tiltrotor is the solution to its Medium Lift Requirement (MLR). The MV-22 now 
represents the only version of this concept, currently nearing production. [Ref. I] 
In the commercial market, the status of tiltrotor development is quite different. 
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The commercial potential of the Tiltrotor is tremendous. . . This unique 
capability makes it a viable solution to many of the major problems facing 
2 
the industry today. [The Honorable Tom Lewis (R-Fl) Opening Statement 
Civil Tiltrotor Hearing July 17, 1990] [Ref.1 :p.23] 
Several years ago, the Japanese Minister of Trade visited the Bell Plant to observe 
the tiltrotor. Congressman Geren, in describing both the Japanese Minister's reactions and 
words, wrote: 
He watched the aircraft take off; he watched it maneuver; he saw the many 
things that it was capable of doing. I am sure that he let his imagination 
run wild as he thought about the congestion problems and the transportation 
problems that they have in their country and he said flatly, 'If you build it, 
we'll buy it. If you don't build it, we will.' [Ref.1:p.5] 
Similar to past revolutionary concepts, such as the first jet aircraft or the first 
rotorcraft, the tiltrotor may promise vastly new capabilities and potential. Still, as of 1996, 
in the civil arena, there has been no firm commitment to develop this unique technology. 
Why? 
According to a industry base impact study concerning the effects of tiltrotor 
technology: 
Transfer of technology between military and commercial applications is as 
old as human kind ... The military has been responsible, directly and 
indirectly, for a vast number of important technological contributions to 
modern society. These contributions span a wide spectrum of economic 
activity from research and development to the implementation of finished 
products and systems ... Finished products made for the military and 
subsequently adopted by commercial manufacturers run from such simple 
items as fasteners to sophisticated technologies such as computers and 
radar, and to such complex products and systems as rockets and other 
aerospace applications. [Ref.2:p.27] 
From the previous statement one can see that the MV-22 may represent more than 
just the next leap in aviation technological advance. The Marine Corps' procurement 
3 
could be another example of a historical trend that has existed as long as the aviation 
industry. Civil applications of advanced aviation concepts have, to a large extent, been 
contingent upon the Government (particularly Defense) bearing the lion's share of 
development costs and risks associated with proving new technologies. [Ref.l] 
It is the researcher's contention that civil tiltrotor (CTR) applications are likely to 
occur, only as a result of continued Defense development and procurement of the MV-22. 
B. OBJECTIVE AND TENTATIVE HYPOTHESIS 
The main objective of this thesis research will be to validate or reject the 
researcher's tentative hypothesis. That hypothesis is that CTR applications are following 
a historical trend, and that Defense development and procurement of the MV -22 
Osprey is a prerequisite to commercial development of the tiltrotor. 
The following is the primary research question: 
Are potential CTR applications dependent on Defense development and 
procurement of the MV -22 Osprey, and if so, to what extent? 
The primary research question can be divided into a number of smaller subsidiary 
research questions to make the investigation more manageable. They are: 
1. Is there an historical commercial aviation dependence on Defense aviation 
research and development efforts? 
2. What are the historical barriers to commercial aviation innovation, and to what 
extent have these barriers been influenced by past Defense aviation 
development efforts? 
4 
3. Is there market potential for CTR applications, and if so, in what areas do 
these markets apply? 
4. What are the barriers to commercial innovation of the tiltrotor concept? 
5. Has previous Defense involvement in tiltrotor research and development (other 
than the MV-22), had any influence in overcoming the barriers associated with 
the CTR, and if so, to what extent? 
6. Will Defense development efforts involving the MV -22 help influence any of 
the barriers associated with the CTR, and if so, to what extent? 
7. Are there any other benefits that potential CTR applications are gaining, or 
likely to gain from Defense development and procurement of the MV -22? 
C. SCOPE 
The focus of this research effort entails an examination of the following: 
1. The historical relationship between Defense aviation development and 
commercial aviation innovation. 
2. The history of tiltrotor research and development. 
3. The market potential for civil applications of tiltrotor technology. 
4. The current state of CTR research and development. This includes any 
considerations impacting on current and future CTR development. 
5. How continued development and procurement of the MV-22 relates to the 
future potential of CTR applications. This includes potential CTR gains from 
technology transfer or other benefits. 
There are a myriad of applications in which tiltrotor technology is envisioned to 
operate. An in-depth analysis of each one would be impractical given the available time 
and resources. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, the majority of applications 
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will be mentioned only briefly. However, it is necessary to provide clarification regarding 
the use of two terms that relate to all potential applications. This may have been 
accomplished best by Boeing's CTR Marketing head, Steve Barlage. In an interview, 
Barlage presented standard terminology used throughout the aviation industry to define 
potential tiltrotor markets. As Barlage described it: 
The term civil refers to all tiltrotor applications other than military. 
Whereas commercial refers only to those applications involving for hire. 
The term commercial is therefore a subset of civil. Despite this distinction, 
the term civil is commonly misused and applied even when referring 
exclusively to commercial applications. [Ref.4] 
For purposes of this thesis, unless otherwise clarified, both terms will refer to the 
short-haul commercial passenger market. Other markets will be identified, and briefly 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
Additionally, the researcher feels compelled to clarify the use of two additional 
terms as they relate to the research material. First, the term technical feasibility, refers 
only to the technical capability of producing an aircraft that is representative of a particular 
concept. Second, the term economic viability refers to the practicality of employing and 
successfully sustaining operations, with due consideration given to the impact of economic 
factors. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis involves a qualitative research process. Having constructed a tentative 
hypothesis during thesis proposal formulation, analytic induction was used as an alternative 
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to field research to validate or reject the hypothesis. This thesis did not lend itself to 
observation. Two data collection alternatives were used. 
The first method involved a comprehensive review of relevant literature. It 
involved obtaining documents through organizations such as the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), Boeing Helicopters, 
Bell Helicopter Textron, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the MV -22 Program Office. 
Second, to the extent that adequate data collection and analysis could not be 
accomplished solely through literature or other sources, the researcher conducted personal 
interviews. These interviews include various experts or well versed authorities from across 
the spectrum of Government, Defense, and private industry. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II provides background for the study, by examining the historical 
relationship between Defense aviation development and commercial aviation innovation. 
The historical barriers to commercial aviation innovation are identified and discussed. 
Finally, how those barriers have been influenced through Defense aviation efforts are 
highlighted. 
Chapter III presents an overview of Defense research and development efforts, 
specifically involving tiltrotor technology. It recounts the history of vertical flight, and 
examines the genealogy of the tiltrotor concept. It also highlights the relationship between 
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four tiltrotor developmental prototypes, in establishing the technical feasibility and 
maturity of the tiltrotor concept. 
Chapter IV assesses the overall market potential for civil and commerci~l 
applications of the tiltrotor concept. It examines previous market research conducted over 
the last ten year period. The chapter's focus is the identification and discussion· of any 
barriers that inhibit commercial introduction of CTR applications. 
Chapter V identifies and discusses any evidence of a dependence between Defense 
development of the MV -22, and commercial innovation of the tiltrotor concept. The 
chapter also addresses technology transfer, learning experience, and other benefits derived 
from Defense development of the Osprey. 
Chapter VI draws conclusions and lessons learned based on the data and evidence 
collected. The chapter answers both the primary, and subsidiary research questions. It also 
provides an opportunity for the researcher to address lessons learned, and to make 
recommendations regarding areas warranting further research. 
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II. CIVIL AVIATION'S HISTORICAL DEPENDENCE ON DEFENSE 
AVIATION DEVELOPMENT 
Military aviation has a history of its own. But it has also served as contributor and 
precursor to some of the early innovation and evolution that has taken place in civil 
aviation. According to Miller and Sawers, some of the most significant aviation develop-
ments such as the jet aircraft and helicopter, first came to fruition in military aircraft de-
signs. Furthermore, a large percentage of these advances have ultimately evolved, and 
been exploited through commercial and/or civil operational use. [Ref.5] 
As Congressman Robert G. Torricelli pointed out in Congressional hearings, "vir-
tually all major advances in aviation in this country have had a military technological 
precursor. .. that is unlikely to change in the near term." [Ref.l :p.l] 
This chapter will examine the early relationship between Defense aviation devel-
opment and civil aviation innovation. It begins with a discussion of the concept of 
technical innovation, and the elements that comprise it. This includes a look at the concept 
from both a general point of view, as well as from the unique perspective of the aviation 
industry. This requires examining the precursors to innovation, and its overriding eco-
nomic underpinnings. Some of the more significant historical barriers to commercial avia-
tion will then be identified and discussed. Next, how these barriers have been influenced, 
through Defense development and operational use, will be explored. Finally, some of the 
more revolutionary technologies that reflect this early dependence will be discussed. 
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A. CIVIL AVIATION INNOVATION; ITS PRECURSORS AND ECONOMIC 
UNDERPINNINGS 
There are many factors that influence the source of innovation. Eric von Hippe! 
in his book entitled "The Sources of Innovation" argues that "variations in the sources of 
innovation are caused to a significant degree by variations in potential innovators' 
expectations of innovation-related profits." [Ref.6:p.6] However, to fully understand the 
nature of innovation, its origin and precursors must first be examined. 
1. Invention, Development, and Innovation 
Miller and Sawers seem to provide one of the most clear and concise discussions 
of what invention, development, and innovation are: 
Invention is the idea or the experiment that makes a new product or process 
possible, while development turns the first crude product into something 
that is commercially useable. Innovation is the exploitation of the 
developed invention. [Ref.5:p.5] 
2. Who Instigates Civil Aviation Innovation? 
In regards to who specifically instigates innovation, Von Hippel helps clarify and 
correct a widely held misconception. He writes: 
It has long been assumed that product innovations are typically developed 
by product manufacturers. Because this assumption deals with the basic 
matter of who the innovator is ... it now appears that this basic assumption 
is often wrong ... the sources of innovation vary greatly. In some fields 
innovation users develop most innovations. [Ref.6:p.3] 
This is particularly relevant in the case of the aviation industry. In this context, 
the "user" refers to the military or the commercial airline operators, and not passengers 
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or flight crews. For commercial aviation it is unlikely that aircraft manufacturers like 
Boeing, Lockheed, or McDonell Douglas are the driving force behind aircraft innovation. 
Rather, it is United, Delta, or American. This contention is strongly supported by the 
aircraft manufacturers themselves. Take for example, the statement by Edward J. 
Renouard, Executive Vice President and General Manager of Boeing Helicopters, who in 
testimony before Congress emphatically stated that "we [Boeing] do not launch new 
aircraft programs, our customers do" [Ref. I :p. 70]. It could be said then, that "Users" are 
the instigating or driving forces behind a majority of aviation technological innovations. 
3. Why Do Users Innovate? 
Is commercial aviation innovation a result of spontaneous scientific discovery, 
invention, or available technical knowledge? Or is the innovation of aviation technology 
stimulated more by the business prosperity of the innovator, or growing market demand 
for a particular aircraft capability? "The traditional view is generally that discovery and 
invention are independent of economical factors in their incidence, but not in their applica-
tion." [Ref.5:p.6] Available literature tends to endorse the idea that the origin of 
_invention may be scientifically or technically based, but that without the additional influ-
ence of economic factors (i.e., the potential for profit), the commercial exploitation and 
application of that invention is unlikely to occur. [Ref.5] 
The term exploitation as used by Miller and Sawers seems a choice description of 
innovation. Particularly, when used in the commercial context, and paired with the views 
of others on the subject. In Bela Gold's book entitled "Research, Technological Change, 
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and Economic Analysis, Gold writes: "Technological innovations are inherently attractive, 
especially in terms of the economic rewards which are widely considered to be overriding 
in business organizations." [Ref. 7:p.l] Commercial aviation users invest and innovate as 
part of their overall strategic plan to remain competitive. The overriding economic 
rewards as a result of their investment, competitiveness, and successful exploitation are 
profits. [Ref. 7] The manufacturer is therefore dependent upon the propensity of the 
commercial aircraft user to innovate. [Ref.5] 
One expert's opinion concerning what has been discussed to this point is provided 
by F.M. Scherer, in his book entitled "Innovation and Growth." As Scherer sees it: 
Although each of the functions appears to be a necessary condition for 
technological advance, it is possible that innovation, investment, and devel-
opment are more sensitive to economic variables than invention is. 
Inventive acts of insight may follow from scientific curiosity and a fortu-
itous combination of chance factors without any direct stimulus from profit 
expectations ... execution of the innovative, investment, and developmental 
functions depend much more directly than invention on these economic 
factors. [Ref. 8: p. 26] 
B. CIVIL AVIATION INNOVATION; THE BARRIERS 
Literature on the history of commercial aviation makes reference to several major 
barriers effecting successful innovation. Somewhat vague and open to interpretation, the 
researcher has made the following generalized observations in regards to interpreting the 
historical literature. 
First, there appears to be three major barriers that apply to both the fixed-wing 
airplane, as well as the helicopter. They are: 
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1. Public acceptance 
2. Technical risks 
3. Financial risks. [Refs.1, 2, 5 and 9] 
There also appears to have been two additional barriers, that in the past, applied 
only to the helicopter. Furthermore, these barriers only applied when discussing the helic-
opter's potential use in the short-haul commercial passenger market. [Ref.2] They are: 
1. The lack of a supporting infrastructure. 
2. A systems problem. 
This last barrier pertains to the lack of a consensus building coalition, capable of 
committing to a heliport network or "system" [Ref.2]. Market studies have eliminated 
the helicopter from consideration as a short-haul market contender [Ref.2]. Still, mention 
of these helicopter barriers is worthwhile, because of their relevance to future application 
of the CTR in this same market. 
The five barriers are influenced and effected by many interrelated issues and 
considerations. So many, that Boorer, in his article on aspects of civil V/STOL aircraft, 
collectively described these issues as being comprised of many "permutations and combina-
tions" [Ref.9:p.ll-2]. Furthermore, Boorer felt there were far too many issues to discuss 
individually [Ref. 9:p.11-2]. 
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Still, it seems appropriate to discuss some of the more key issues. A discussion of 
some of the most relevant issues foiiows: 
1. Public Acceptance 
There are issues involving the public's (passenger) perceptions that are quite unique 
to the aviation industry. Some should be examined in order to have an adequate under-
standing of how perceptions effect the public's acceptance of a new aviation concept. 
Aviation travel has proven to be significantly safer than automobile travel. 
However as Miiier and Sawers describe it: 
Fear plays a larger role in keeping travelers away from airlines than from 
any other transport medium. This remains true even though the relative 
improvement in the safety of airline service, according to the measures 
usually presented, has been greater than for major surface transport media. 
[Ref.5:p.221] 
This is supported by the statistics compiled by the Air Transport Association of 
America, and the National Safety Council over the last half century (Figure 1). 
Despite the realities, the traveling public's perceptions concerning air travel safety 
are far more influential in determining their acceptance and demand, than is the statistical 
_evidence. Furthermore, as described by Brigadier General Robert Magnus, Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Marine Aviation, "the public wants the industry to establish with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that an aircraft's not going to come apart in the air" [Ref.12]. 
Boeing Helicopter's Executive Vice President Edward Renouard believed that 
gaining the acceptance of a new aviation concept, is initiaily, perhaps the most difficult 
of the barriers to overcome. Because, according to Renouard, it "lacks the credibility of 
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experience" [Ref.1:p.93]. To overcome this barrier as Renouard put it "requires expe-
rience and demonstration" [Ref.1:p.92]. 
Sched 
Year Airlines Automobiles Buses Railroads 
1938 5.21 
1946 1.26 
1956 0.64 
1964 0.14 
From [Ref.10:p.32] 
1983 0.01 
1984 0.02 
1985 0.07 
1986 0.002 
1987 0.07 
1988 0.01 
1989 0.04 
1990 0.003 
1991 0.03 
1992 0.01 
1993 0.01 
3.9 
2.5 
2.7 
2.4 
0.98 
0.98 
0.96 
1.27 
1.22 
1.19 
1.12 
0.99 
0.91 
0.83 
0.82 
From [Ref.ll:p.122] 
n/a 
0.19 
0.16 
0.13 
0.05 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.36 
0.18 
0.20 
0.05 
0.04 
1.11 
0.03 
0.03 
0.13 
0.02 
0.06 
0.02 
0.06 
0.02 
0.42 
Figure 1. Comparative Transport Safety Records 
(Fatalities per 100 million passenger- miles) 
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2. Technical Risks 
Lacking the benefit of experience and operational data, in the early stages of 
aviation, the technology was considered far too risky and unreliable. It was therefore 
difficult to convince potential operators to invest in commercial aviation. As a result, for 
years after the airplane's inception the commercial market remained a relatively small one. 
[Ref.5:p.9] The commercial helicopter market remains small to this day [Ref.2]. 
Slow growth rates and a conservative approach to innovation, continue to be 
historic commercial aviation trends. According to the Civil Tiltrotor Development 
Advisory Committee (CTRDAC): 
The speed and success with which new technologies and operational 
concepts can be introduced into transportation systems is strongly affected 
by the degree of innovation involved. [Ref.13:p.81] 
Though operators may see potential in an advanced aircraft concept, that alone is 
not enough to get them to commit to it. Operators first need proof that within the 
capabilities of the aviation engineering community, the concept is technically feasible. It 
therefore becomes what General Magnus described as "a chicken and egg thing" [Ref.12]. 
Others, like Boeing's Renouard, have used this analogy to describe other aspects of 
tiltrotor risk, such as the lack of supporting infrastructure. The researcher believes that 
General Magnus is describing more what one might refer to as a Catch 22 scenario. 
Regardless, our interpretations of the dilemma are the same. That is: Should prospective 
operators be expected to commit resources to an aviation concept without that concept 
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having been proven first? Yet, how can that proof be gained without the resource 
commitment of some entity? 
Furthermore, adding to the operator's cautiousness is that even when proven 
feasible, an aircraft can still fall short of production. Consider the views of General 
Magnus on the subject: 
From an engineering standpoint, there's a lot of things the aviation industry 
has proven it can do. But if nobody else is willing to field the thing, then 
why would the commercial aviation industry [which is extraordinarily 
conservative] want to be the first to take the technical risks of fielding it? 
And the answer is that they wouldn't. [Ref.12] 
According to Boeing's Renouard, "air carriers are very conservative about adopting 
new technologies because they can afford zero risk in either safety or dispatch reliability" 
[Ref.l:p.93]. 
This statement is representative of a basic tenant concerning the relationship be-
tween technical risk and innovation. As Scherer explains it: 
it: 
It illustrates cogently a principle that has widespread application in the 
innovation of new products and processes: the concept of undertaking 
costly specific development projects only when these basic uncertainties 
have been sufficiently reduced. [Ref.8:p.5] 
3. Financial Risks 
According to General Magnus, it all comes back to economics. As he explained 
Proving an avtatlon concept technically feasible simply answers the 
question as to whether or not the technology can be built from an engi-
neering standpoint. It does not concern itself with answering the question 
as to whether it can be built and operated for a price. [Ref.12] 
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For those who are willing to assume the financial risks associated with innovation, 
Joseph A. Schumpeter in his book entitled "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy" argues 
that: 
Those who succeed at innovating are rewarded by having temporary 
monopoly control over what they have created. This control, in turn, is the 
lever that allows innovators to gain an enhanced position in the market and 
related temporary profits from their innovations. [Ref.l4] 
Schumpeter puts a positive spin on this temporary edge. Professor J .K. Galbraith 
saw it somewhat differently in his book "American Capitalism." He wrote: 
Following development, imitators appear so quickly that a firm in a 
competitive situation gains only the fleeting rewards of a head start. 
[Ref.15:p.87] 
Because of this situation, Galbraith points out that: 
Only a firm large enough to afford the high cost of developing a modern 
invention is able to profit from its investment. Rising development costs, 
have made these rewards inadequate to encourage investment. 
[Ref.15:p.87] 
This situation has grown so serious according to Renouard of Boeing that: 
The principle cause for the apparent decline of the U.S. aviation industry 
is high (and growing) development costs. This record of the civil aircraft 
industry's declining ability to stay afloat in a long economic boom is alarm-
ing. It is particularly troubling in that, ... there is no solution in sight. 
[Ref. I :p. 96] 
Peter Schwartz points out in his discussion on innovation and investment that 
"innovation is a gamblers game, and therefore cautious investment means slower growth" 
[Ref.16:p.193]. Despite this apparent cautiousness, as Scherer points out, "both invention 
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and innovation, along with investment, are necessary and complimentary functions in the 
advance of technology" [Ref.8:p.25] 
4. Lack of Supporting Infrastructure 
An aviation supporting infrastructure pertains to the framework of various 
organizations, facilities, and services required to support the operation of an aircraft. In 
the early years of fixed-wing innovation, infrastructure was not a major barrier. Aviation 
operations were so limited, as were the capabilities of the aircraft themselves, that there 
were few support requirements. [Ref.5] 
This changed, and over the course of many years both a national and global 
aviation infrastructure evolved. The infrastructure emerged not so much a result of 
strategic planning, but more out of necessity. As aircraft advanced, so too did the need 
for the infrastructure to support it. As the infrastructure improved, so to did the potential 
for further aircraft innovations. The two inputs to the system responded to each other, and 
evolved together. [Ref.5] 
What permitted such an evolutionary process to begin nearly a century ago was the 
relative simplicity of the flying machines, and the negligible demands they initially had for 
infrastructure. [Ref.5] It could not happen that way today. The capabilities of today's 
modern aircraft are beyond the imaginations of yesterday's innovators. With that added 
capability comes an increased burden on the support structure in order to fully realize those 
capabilities. [Ref.5] 
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Today we have a mature, national transportation system, in which one element can 
not flourish independently. The long term economic viability of a new innovation is 
dependent to a great extent, on the capabilities of the infrastructure to support it. [Ref.~] 
This barrier was realized with the attempted introduction of the helicopter into the short-
haul commercial passenger market [Ref.2]. 
5. A Systems Problem 
What the conventional fixed-wing aircraft had in its favor, was that the aircraft and 
its infrastructure developed concurrently. In the case of the helicopter, the infrastructure 
required to support short-haul commercial passenger service did not develop. [Ref.2] In 
regards to obtaining the necessary structure and support mechanisms, we are confronted 
with what Boeing's Renouard referred to as "the chicken and egg situation." He also 
referred to it as "a systems problem" [Ref.l:p.94]. 
On the one hand, the costs associated with building a new infrastructure or 
modifying the existing one to accommodate future innovations would prove cost prohibi-
tive. On the other hand, fielding potential advanced technologies may prove impossible 
without the support structure to do so. Investors are incapable of providing what Renouard 
refers to as "patient capital" [Ref.l :p. 96]. Patient capital refers to long-term investment 
which is aimed at ensuring the long term economic viability of the new technology. It 
includes such initiatives as planning and constructing aerodromes and facilities, and 
instituting required changes to the Air Traffic Control System (ATCS). [Ref.l:p.96] 
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The total investment in infrastructure to accommodate the introduction of a new 
aircraft is according to Renouard: 
Clearly beyond the control of industry. Federal effort will be needed in 
this chicken and egg situation. [Ref.l:p.94] 
C. DEFENSE AVIATION'S CONTRffiUTION IN OVERCOMING THE 
COMMERCIAL BARRIERS 
Once early aviation pioneers achieved the first flyable prototypes, they turned to 
the war departments of the world to support the development of their inventions. It was 
also from the military that early manufacturers gained their first requests for aircraft 
production. [Ref. 5] 
1. Leadership in Research and Development 
The general unwillingness of private investors to take the lead in aviation 
technological development is not new. According to Miller and Sawers "the history of the 
airline industry predisposed it to lean on the governments" [Ref.5:p.2]. Most research and 
development efforts associated with radical leaps in aviation technology have been lead and 
funded by Government efforts [Ref.5]. 
Aircraft manufacturers have, in most cases, been unwilling to assume the full finan-
cial responsibilities associated with development, as well [Ref.17:p.50]. As explained in 
a Defense News article, aviation research and development has been comprised of just as 
many unsuccessful attempts, as successful innovations. Additionally, there have been air-
craft that were proven technically feasible, yet not produced. For many reasons, including 
21 
competing priorities and limited resources, there is no guarantee that the Defense Depart-
ment will pursue a technology any further. [Ref.17:p.50] 
Aircraft manufacturers are keenly aware of this reality, and make their business 
decisions concerning development costs accordingly. As explained in that same Defense 
News article, "the Navy needs to take moves to reassure industry about its intentions to 
produce the systems industry develops" [Ref.17:p.50]. 
If past trends are indicative of things to come, "companies [manufacturers] will be 
unwilling to take big risks developing systems that the military may or may not buy" 
[Ref.17:p.50]. This is true according to the Defense News article because: 
Industry needs to be reassured it can earn reasonable profits based not only 
on the systems it develops that go into procurement, but also on systems 
that do not move into procurement. [Ref.17:p.l] 
Innovators and manufacturers are driven primarily by profit. An aircraft 
manufacturer's ultimate goal then, is to get an aircraft design to the production phase. The 
commercial operator ultimately wants to recoup their investment in the operating 
environment. Neither manufacturer, nor potential operators, are particularly interested in 
using their own finances to develop these aircraft. [Ref.5] 
Manufacturers prefer their customers to help share the cost of developing aircraft, 
regardless of who the customer is. Commercial operators would prefer to exploit aviation 
technologies once developed and financed by someone else. [Ref.5] 
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Both manufacturers and commercial operators have long depended on the Defense 
Department to help overcome the technical and financial barriers to commercial aviation. 
The Government has accomplished this through its risk taking leadership, and its will-
ingness to assume a great deal of the costs of research and developments. [Ref.5] 
2. Providing Operational Experience 
During the introductory phase of an advanced aircraft design, the Defense Depart-
ment inadvertently risks the lives of some of its personnel enroute to gaining valuable 
operational experience. This view is.supported by Tom Archer, an FAA Rotorcraft Certif-
ication Directorate. In an interview with the researcher, Archer, a reserve military aviator 
felt that "it's always been politically less sensitive to kill a few military aviators in proving 
an aircraft, as opposed to killing members of the general public" [Ref.l8]. 
Though more subtle in his delivery, Congressman Pete Geren, R-Texas, essentially 
holds a similar view. In an interview, Congressman Geren maintained that it is widely held 
that, "if you want to prove a technology, let the military break it first" [Ref.19]. 
Gaining operational experience is necessary to prove a technology's commercial 
potential. It provides evidence over time that any design deficiencies or "bugs" that were 
present during development, have been dealt with, and eliminated. Boeing's Renouard 
supports this idea as well. According to Renouard, "Bell-Boeing market surveys confirm 
that the user insists that such technologies be wrung-out by military operating experience" 
[Ref. I :p. 93]. 
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In addition to influencing the public acceptance and technical risk barriers, gaining 
operational experience can also help mitigate the financial risks. According to Bell's 
Horner, commercial carriers are interested in the experience gained by the military because 
"potential operators want validated reliability, maintenance, safety, environmental, and 
operating cost data" [Ref.l:p.93]. 
Some experts believe that overcoming the acceptance barrier was what ultimately 
paved the way for commercial aviation. [Ref. 1 and 5] According to Miller and Sawers, 
by the end of World War I, "airlines were already being planned ... based on optimistic 
assumptions." [Ref.5:p.12] Miller and Sawers further explain that these assumptions 
concerned the savings and reliability that could be derived from proven military aviation 
technology, as well "the number of travelers that would be prepared to fly" [Ref.5:p.12]. 
D. CIVIL INNOVATION OF MILITARY AVIATION TECHNOLOGY 
Following World War I, most of the early airlines used converted military 
machines, and later derivatives of them. However at the time, only a few German 
machines, like the Junkers and Rohrbach, "pointed the way towards the truly commercial 
airplane of the future" [Ref.5:p.2]. 
For more than 20 years following World War I, airlines only got bigger, faster, 
more powerful, and able to fly for longer distances, with pressurized fuselages to allow 
higher. flying. But the technology remained basically unchanged. [Ref. 5] In the 
following years, military development of three key technologies was eventually exploited 
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by the commercial aviation industry. Those technologies include the jet engine, the large 
jet aircraft, and the helicopter. [Refs. 2 and 5] 
1. Government Contributes the Jet Engine 
In the late 1930s, preparations for World War II concentrated efforts on military 
aircraft. According to Miller and Sawers, it also helped push one of the most fundamental 
technological advances in design that the aviation world has ever seen; the jet engine. 
[Ref.5] 
The jet engine came into military service about 15 years before it was established 
in the airlines. [Ref.5] According to a Department of Transportation (DOT) study "the 
most unequivocal gift that governments made to the aircraft industry was the jet engine." 
[Ref.2:p.39] Furthermore, according to the study, the J-57 engine "would not have been 
developed but for the complex interdependence of government and private sectors." 
[Ref.2:p.38] 
2. Evolution of the Commercial Airliner 
Through the 1940s and 1950s, at government expense and primarily for military 
use, technology involving both airframes and jet power plants were gradually improved. 
[Ref.5] These advances were most notably achieved in both the B-47 and B-52 bombers. 
[Ref.2] 
Early in the 1950s engines originally designed for the military were adapted into 
commercial aircraft. The first jetliner was the British de Havilland Comet I, flown in 
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1952. After two years of flying, four accidents related to structural integrity led to its 
termination. [Ref.2:p.38] 
Boeing, having success in its military B-47 and B-52 designs, was initially 
unsuccessful in interesting airlines in a civilian jet transport. One of the key factors 
according to the DOT was the lack of experience in military jets. [Ref.2:p.39] 
Boeing went forward with development of a large commercial prototype using its 
own resources. The prototype known as the 367-80, was the pre-production version of 
what later became the Boeing 707. The DOT study maintained that "the 367-80s 
aerodynamics plainly owed much to Boeing's prior experience with military jet airplanes." 
[Ref.2:p.39] It took advantage of the B-47's swept-back wings, and the J-57 engine 
utilized in the B-52. [Ref.2] Several months after the 367-80's first flight, Pan Am 
ordered twenty 707s, precipitating what the DOT study referred to as "a year-long jet-
buying spree by the world's airlines" [Ref.2:p.40]. 
The subsequent history of commercial aviation is one of a growing market, and 
steady divergence from its early dependence on military technological advances. This is 
_primarily true, because advances occurring since the 1950s have been more iterative in 
nature, as opposed to being considered revolutionary innovations. [Ref.2:p.30] 
3. Evolution of the Commercial Helicopter 
Built with private funds, the Sikorsky VS-300 helicopter made its first flight in 
1940. Within a year Sikorsky won a contract with the Army. Since that time, according 
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to the DOT study, "the military has been a primary force in the helicopter industry." 
[Ref.2:p.31] 
The commercial helicopter industry grew rapidly in response to military advances. 
The R-series helicopter helped prove the technology during the later years of World War 
IT. The S-51 became the first civil derivative, and was a direct spinoff of the R-5 military 
helicopter. [Ref.2] 
The Air Force awarded Sikorsky an additional military contract in 1949 to build 
the H-19. This ten passenger aircraft was eventually ordered by all the Services for use 
in Korea. It too had a direct civil spinoff certified as the S-55 in 1952. [Ref.2] 
The HR2S built for the Marine Corps was one of the largest of the early 
helicopters, capable of seating 26 passengers. Its civil spinoff, the S-56 was relatively 
unsuccessful in finding a market. [Ref.2] 
The last Sikorsky product built for the military in the 1950s was the HSS-2. Built 
for the Navy, it seated 25. According to the DOT study, its civil variant, the S-61 was 
certified "after more than 1400 hours of test and demonstration flights as a Navy 
helicopter." [Ref.2:p.34] 
According to the DOT study, "commercial versions of military models often 
needed few modifications beyond interior improvements." [Ref.2:p.34] Additionally, 
military contracts provided financial safety nets, such that manufacturers could risk 
venturing into the civil market. [Ref.2] 
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According to the DOT study, civil helicopter use owes much of its success in 
making inroads over the traditional public acceptance barrier, to military operational 
experience during the Korean War. [Ref.2:p.35] 
However, while helicopters have entered the civil sector, the market for 
commercial use of the helicopter has never materialized to the industry's expectations. 
[Ref.2] A late 1960's study to investigate the potential use of helicopters in the short-haul 
passenger market identified why. Two key barriers were identified. First, the industry 
was unable to rally the required support to develop a intra-city helicopter infrastructure. 
Second, the industry concluded that : 
The costs and benefits of intercity helicopter service were impossible for 
any one party to internalize - not the airlines nor the cities nor the Federal 
Government - that could justify the substantial expenditures needed up front 
to implement such a service. [Ref.20] 
Very similar to the commercial airline industry, beginning in the 1960's, military 
and commercial helicopter technologies began taking on their own unique requirements 
and characteristics. As an example of this, consider that in the 1970s "military helicopters 
cost on average more than three times as much as commercial helicopters." [Ref.2:p.37] 
Though their unique market demands may be causing divergence between the military and 
civil helicopter industries, John F. Ward in his article on the future of rotorcraft makes a 
point worth considering. Ward points out that forecasts of future helicopter market 
penetration show a declining trend. He goes on to argue, however, that in the future, as 
in the past, military rotorcraft programs will directly support and influence future civil 
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developments. Ward summed up his optimistic outlook by emphasizing that the military 
development of new capabilities "has been the single most important catalyst in the 
development of the civil rotorcraft industry." [Ref.21:p.235] 
Finally, supporting Ward's observation on market trends, consideration of the 
helicopter in the short-haul passenger market was abandoned in the early 1980's. A further 
discussion of this subject will be presented in Chapter IV. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided background concerning the civil aviation industry's 
dependence on Defense development of advanced aviation technologies. The concept of 
technical innovation, particularly how it relates to commercial aviation was briefly 
described. Five key barriers to commercial aviation innovation were identified and 
discussed. Next, a discussion of how historically, the Defense Department has contributed 
in overcoming these barriers was provided. Finally, specific examples of military aviation 
technologies and their commercial derivatives were identified. 
The next chapter will describe the history of Defense research and development 
specifically involving tiltrotor aircraft. 
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ill. DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE TILTROTOR 
This chapter introduces the tiltrotor concept; a member of the Vertical/Shqrt 
Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) category of aircraft. It explores the tiltrotor' s genealogy, 
and its relationship with other, early attempts at achieving vertical flight. 
It chronicles past research and development efforts specific to the tiltrotor concept, 
and in particular, the role Defense has played in them. A main purpose of these efforts is 
to highlight a continuing link between the DOD's current undertaking, the MV-22 Osprey, 
and its previous tiltrotor R&D efforts. 
Finally, the research will examine whether previous Defense involvement in 
tiltrotor R&D has helped satisfy or overcome any of the historical barriers to commercial 
aviation innovation. 
A. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE TERMS 
It is necessary to clarify the use of three terms pertaining to aviation concepts, other 
than the Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) airplane. 
1. VTOL - Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
2. STOL- Short Takeoff and Landing 
3. V/STOL- Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing 
According to David L. Kohlman in his book entitled Introduction To V/STOL 
Airplanes, a VTOL aircraft "must be able to takeoff, hover, and land with zero airspeed." 
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[Ref.22:p.3] The conventional helicopter is what immediately comes to mind. However 
others, like the tiltrotor and AV-8 Harrier, though not exclusively VTOL aircraft, are both 
VTOL capable. 
The term STOL is somewhat more ambiguous. It cannot be defined simply in terms 
of it's takeoff and landing distance. Kohlman states that: 
STOL aircraft are identified not merely by the required field length, but by 
the field length in relation to weight, cruise speed, and wing loading. No 
one parameter is sufficient for an adequate definition of STOL 
performance. [Ref.22:p.4] 
The old "autogiros," which lacked the ability to hover, are STOL examples. The 
Cessna 152, despite the fact that it may require no more takeoff roll then the Harrier, does 
not qualify as a STOL aircraft [Ref.22]. Once again, the Harrier, though not exclusively 
a STOL aircraft, typically operates in the STOL configuration. This is so for a several 
reasons, two of which pertain to this discussion. 
First, because of mission duration and the fuel inefficiency of the Harrier's vertical 
thrust producing system, the mission pilot may have to avoid the pure VTOL mode 
_whenever possible [Ref.22]. Second, the Harrier's ability to hover is highly dependent on 
takeoff weight and environmental conditions. 
Kohlman defines a V/STOL aircraft as "one that can both hover in a VTOL mode 
or takeoff and land in the STOL mode." [Ref.22:p.5] A V/STOL aircraft must be able to 
accomplish both VTOL and STOL, as opposed to just one or the other, but owes its 
lineage to both categories. 
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Still, further clarification may be useful. For example, some might point out that 
the conventional helicopter (even the skid configured) can operate in the STOL mode, such 
as when executing a "sliding" takeoff or landing. They could argue then, that the 
helicopter satisfies the requirement for classification as a V/STOL aircraft. But as John 
Paul Campbell points out in his book entitled "Vertical Takeoff And Landing Aircraft": 
The V/STOL transport is a machine that would be designed with enough 
power to hover or takeoff and land vertically when ever necessary, but in 
most operations it would probably use short takeoff and landing runs for 
improved economy, better handling qualities, and greater safety in event of 
engine failure. [Ref.23:p.184] 
The helicopter would not appear to fit Campbell's description of a V/STOL 
aircraft. Further support for this lack of fit is provided by John J. Schneider in his article 
entitled Rotary Wing V/STOL. According to Schneider, although conventional helicopters 
may be made to loosely fit the definition of V/STOL, and sometimes are, they are 
generally excluded. They are more appropriately categorized exclusively as VTOL 
aircraft. [Ref.24:p.172] 
In practice according to Kohlman, V/STOL aircraft are capable of much higher 
speeds, and have more of the qualities of an airplane. "Cruise performance comparable 
to conventional aircraft must also be possible." [Ref.22:p.5] 
Though substantially unique in comparison to one another, both the Harrier and tiltrotor 
aircraft qualify as V/STOL aircraft. 
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B. THE BEGINNINGS OF VERTICAL FLIGHT 
Early development of the fixed wing airplane culminated with the well known 
success of Orville and Wilbur Wright on December 17, 1903. As presented in Chapter II, 
it was followed by periodic revolutionary advances due primarily to the developmental 
initiatives of the military. [Refs.2 and 5] 
Most people are under the perception that it took years longer to achieve vertical 
flight. But as Hal Hellman in his book entitled "Helicopters And Other VTOLS" points 
out: 
The first flights of a full-scale vertical rising aircraft came only a few years 
after the Wright brothers flight. In 1907, two different machines made that 
first painful step. [Ref.25:p.31] 
Hellman was making reference to two French "helicopter-like" prototypes that 
successfully achieved hover flight for short periods of time. As in many early rotorcraft 
experiments, both remained tethered, because they were otherwise uncontrollable. 
[Ref.25:p.31] 
Surprisingly, the earliest visionaries actually thought first in terms of vertical 
takeoff and landing, as opposed to conventional flight. As Hellman described man's 
aviation beginnings: 
He watched the birds, nature's most magnificent fliers, for some clues. 
And what did he see? Most of them seemed to able to rise vertically and to 
land in the same manner. It apparently never occurred to man to class 
himself with the larger birds who cannot accomplish VTOL. As a result 
many of his early attempts were based on flapping flight from a standing 
position. [Ref.25:p.25] 
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According to Hellman, because man's early aviation pursuits focused on the 
complexities and requirements of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL}, coupled with 
technological limitations of the period, "the ungainly craft called orinthopters (literally bird 
wings) were doomed to failure." [Ref.25:p.26] Hellman felt the early visionaries erred 
in not trying to pursue the use of fixed wing concepts first, or "emulate the gliding flight 
of the larger ones [birds]." [Ref.24:p.26] The difficulties he eluded to were a combination 
of two factors; one technical, and one aerodynamic. These factors pertained primarily to 
the limited power generation of available propulsion systems (engines}, coupled with the 
increased lift requirements of vertical flight as opposed to conventional flight. [Ref.23] 
Both will be discussed in further detail later. Hellman saw an additional flaw in the 
orinthopter concept as rooted in the failure to separate the lifting surfaces from the 
propulsion system [Ref.25:p.26]. 
The "Chinese top" (actually a toy) dating from 400 B.C., consisted of a short stick 
with at least two feathers at the top serving as rotors. As Campbell explained "when the 
stick was spun between the hands and released, the toy would rise vertically like a 
helicopter, then descend as the spinning slowed." [Ref.23:p.8] This design embodied 
separation of the lifting surfaces (rotors}, and propulsion system (hands) that Hellman 
described as necessary; however, it did not employ fixed wing concepts. Still many, like 
Campbell, believed the Chinese top, was to some degree, a successful beginning for the 
VTOL concept: 
35 
The principle of vertical takeoff and landing is certainly not a recent 
discovery. The Chinese are created with the first development in this field 
over 2,000 years ago. [Ref.23:p.8] 
There are no recorded additional designs in the VTOL category until Leonardo da 
Vinci's "aerial screw" came about in 1483 [Ref.23:p.8]. Da Vinci's design however, was 
never actually attempted. 
During the nineteenth century, aviation inventors designed a variety of both vertical 
lift aircraft and winged airplanes. In 1843, Sir George Cayley of England designed his 
"aerial carriage" that had both rotors for hovering and propellers for cruise flight 
[Ref.23:p.8]. Though Hellman saw the V/TOL concept as the wrong way to initially 
pursue successful flight, he credits Cayley's VTOL design with being the first of any, to 
incorporate the separation of lifting and propulsion systems. "His idea history has shown, 
to be correct." [Ref.25:p.26] 
Though there were earlier VTOL designs (conceptually) like the orinthopter and 
pure helicopter, Campbell believed Cayley's conceptual design ,was probably the earliest 
precursor to the V/STOL category. [Ref.23:p.13] Still, it did not incorporate fixed wing 
concepts. However, "the idea was remarkably modern in concept." [Ref.25:p.30] 
C. THE V/STOL CATEGORY 
The category of aircraft known as V/STOL encompasses a broad range of unique 
applications. Along with them, come a diverse range of engineering complexity. V/STOL 
research and development has produced an amazing variety of configurations because as 
Kohlman felt, "there are so many possible solutions to the same problems." [Ref.22:p.3] 
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Campbell describes V/STOL aircraft as differing from the conventional airplane 
in two essential respects. They are the power required to hover as opposed to forward or 
cruise flight, and problems associated with stability and control. [Ref.23:p.24] Both 
differences relate to aerodynamic characteristics associated solely with vertical flight. 
First, in regards to the power required, Campbell states that: 
Thrust like weight, is measured in pounds. Conventional aircraft have 
values of thrust at takeoff that are only 30 to 40 per cent of the total weight 
being lifted. They are thus said to have thrust-to-weight ratios of about one 
third. [Ref.23:p.21] 
The thrust-to-weight ratio in the vertical lifting mode must exceed the operating 
weight by some margin. As described by Barnes W. McCormack in his book 
"Aerodynamics of V/STOL Flight," "the development of static thrust to gross weight 
ratios must be greater than one." [Ref.26:p.l] 
Schneider felt that during early attempts to develop VTOL capable designs, the 
inherent power limitations of then, state-of-the-art powerplants, was the greatest obstacle. 
In fact, Schneider believed that overcoming the thrust requirement, three to ten times that 
of a typical airplane, was the factor that delayed the development of the helicopter and the 
V/STOL aircraft by some thirty to forty years. [Ref.24:p.l72] 
Second, as described by Seth B. Anderson in his article on V/STOL aircraft 
technology, the craft must be capable of controlling pitch, roll, and yaw without the 
benefits of aerodynamic forces as a result of its speed, "until sufficient forward velocity 
is obtained." [Ref.27:p.9-4] 
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As propulsion systems evolved, the search for methods to convert horsepower to 
vertical thrust or VTOL, led to use of four vertical thrust producing systems. Though the 
exact terminology used to describe these systems may differ slightly, they generally consist 
of: 
1. Rotors 
2. Propellers 
3. Ducted Fans 
4. Turbofan/Turbojet [Ref.22, 23 and 25] 
Both the thrust and efficiency generated by one horsepower, decreases in 
proportion to the size of the thrust generator or disc area. This varies from the rotors 
being the highest, progressively lower to propellers, ducted fans, and turbofans/turbojets. 
In order to produce an equivalent amount of thrust, the power output (horsepower) 
and "disc loading" on each of the four systems must increase. Disk loading is essentially 
the thrust being produced, divided by the disk area for rotors and propellers, or the exit 
area for ducted fans and turbofans/turbojets. Disc loading on each of the four systems 
increases, moving progressively from rotors toward the turbofan/turbojet. [Ref.23:p.20] 
For each of these VTOL systems, there are four technologies for converting the 
system from the vertical thrusting mode to the horizontal cruising flight mode, or 
achieving what is known as "conversion." [Ref.24:p.106] The four conversion 
technologies are comprised of: 
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1. Tilting Aircraft 
2. Tilting Thrust 
3. Vectored Thrust 
4. Separate (Dual) Thrust [Ref.22, 23, 24] 
There are numerous subtle variations on these combinations. Kohlman however, 
credits Campbell with devising a four by four matrix that identify 16 generally excepted 
configurations. [Ref.22:p.8] 
The simplest method of conversion or redirection of the thrust vector is that of 
tilting the aircraft, a method typically used in the conventional helicopter or pure VTOL. 
A modest 5 to 10 degrees of tilting provides the necessary redirection of the thrust. 
[Ref.23:p.48-50] 
Rather than tilting the aircraft, others have tilted only the thrusting system. 
Employing rotors in this configuration are tiltrotor prototypes like the XV-3, the XV-15, 
the MV-22, and proposed CTR variants. This concept tilts only the rotors, usually on the 
wingtips. The tiltwing tilts the entire wing and propellers. Tilting ducted fans and 
turbofans are similar in concept. [Ref.25:p.108] 
Another approach to thrust tilting is the vectored thrust or thrust deflection method. 
Wing flaps, vane cascades, or nozzle-swiveling systems change the thrust vector 90 
degrees or more. [Ref.23:p.52] The AV-8 Harrier employs swiveling nozzles. 
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Finally, the use of separate thrusters have a long history, involving many attempts 
at developmental prototypes. They are typified by the compound helicopter such as the 
Fairey Rotodyne, wherein rotors are used for vertical lift, while thrust in cruise flight is 
provided by wing mounted propellers or fans. [Ref.23:p.52-53] 
"Performance of V /STOLs generally follows the trend of disc loading--the higher 
the disc loading, the higher the speed and range capability." [Ref.24:p.l73-174] 
Therefore, in cruise flight, helicopters and rotor type V /STOLs have poorer efficiency than 
ducted fans or turbofans/turbojets [Ref.27:p.9-2]. 
Conversely, in a hover or low speed profile, the relative hover time available and 
fuel efficiency decrease with higher disc loading [Ref.24:p.174]. "On this basis, of 
course, rotors have the greatest hovering efficiency and turbojets have the least." 
[Ref.23:p.22] 
As in most concept developments, there are tradeoffs to be considered in selecting 
an appropriate V/STOL design to satisfy a specific requirement. However, according to 
Anderson, "an example of a good compromise in this regard is the tiltrotor concept, which 
has good rotor efficiency in hover and reasonably good propulsive efficiency in cruise." 
[Ref.27:p. 9-2] 
D. PRECURSORS TO THE TILTROTOR 
Using rotors to achieve higher thrust-to-weight ratios at lower disc loading and 
power requirements, the thrust barrier was overcome and VTOL was proven technically 
feasible in 1907 [Ref.25:p.99]. However, due primarily to problems in control according 
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to Campbell, vertical flight did not really become practical until the early 1930s 
[Ref.23:p.12]. Furthermore, because the jet engine had not yet materialized, developers 
were limited to thrust generators of the rotor and prop variety. [Ref.25:p.99] 
By using large rotors which moved large masses of air relatively slowly the 
helicopter builders of the 1930s and 1940s were able to get their aircraft up 
into the air with the engines that were in existence. [Ref.25:p.99] 
Igor Sikorsky is well known for his success in developing pure VTOL technology 
through helicopter design. However V/STOL designs combining fixed wing cruise 
capability with VTOL capability came later. 
It is impossible to discuss the tiltrotor concept without addressing the Baynes 
Heliplane. A British aircraft that was patented in 1937 but never built because of World 
War II, it was described by Georgia Tech's McKeithan as "the first conceptual tiltrotor 
design." [Ref.1 :p.l08] Powered by two gas-generator turbines in the fuselage, they were 
to supply high-pressure gases through a pipe in the wing, to turbines in the wing nacelles. 
[Ref.24:p.174-175] The Heliplane had a striking resemblance to the modern day tiltrotor 
and was the first V/STOL design to incorporate the advantages of fixed wing 
aerodynamics. There were earlier STOL designs that took advantage of fixed wing 
capabilities, but these aircraft lacked the capability to hover. Still, despite the Heliplane's 
advanced design, a true tiltrotor had not yet been built. [Ref.24] 
The Germans of the early 1940s exerted a great deal of influence on later V/STOL 
and tiltrotor development. Henrich Focke created several designs, starting with the Fa-61 
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lateral twin helicopter to perhaps his most interesting one, the Fa-269. The Fa-269 was a 
true tiltrotor design, but of the "pusher" variety. As was the case in most conceptual 
designs, very little developmental work was actually accomplished on the Fa-269. 
[Ref.24:p.176-177] 
W. Laurence LePage, primarily associated with helicopter development, was in 
competition with Sikorsky for a U.S. Army VTOL contract in the late 1930s. LePage later 
suggested a tiltrotor based on his earlier XR-1 tandem rotor helicopter design. 
The proposed design consisted of a conventional airplane fuselage and 
wings, with a rotor mounted at each wingtip ... As the aircraft accelerated, 
however, the rotors could be tilted to operate as propellers. [Ref.24:p.177] 
Again, the LePage design was never developed. 
FollowiJ?.g Sikorsky's success with the VS-300 helicopter and World War II, 
helicopter development continued to make much more progress than the V/STOL concept. 
As a result, according to Schneider, efforts involving the two technologies began to 
become quite distinct. [Ref.24:p.177] 
E. PROVING THE TILTROTOR TECHNICALLY FEASffiLE 
Helicopter development, primarily associated with the military, was now well 
underway. The first tangible progress in V/STOL development followed several years 
later, and was centered around tiltrotor technology. 
1. The Transcendental Model 1-G 
Robert Lichten linked up with an aero engineer by the name of Mario Guerierri. 
Together they formed Transcendental Aircraft in 1945 and began development of the 
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Model 1-G. This was a single place tiltrotor using rotors approximately 17 feet in 
diameter, and having a gross weight of 1,750 pounds. [Ref.24:p.177] According to 
Campbell, "most of this work was done under joint Army-Air Force sponsorship." 
[Ref.23:p. 73]. The first ground test runs were plagued by dynamic rotor and wing 
problems, but after extensive engineering effort the aircraft first achieved free night on 
July 6, 1954. During the following year, over 120 flights were flown, and 23 flight hours 
accumulated. [Ref.24:p.177] The Modell-G's achievements included 115 miles per hour 
in forward flight, with the rotors tilted to a position 70 degrees forward of the horizontal, 
and the lift produced by the wings supporting 90 percent of the aircraft's weight. 
[Ref.23:p. 73] 
The 1-G 's success came to an end however, when it was lost in a ·crash while 
transiting the Delaware River. The accident was not related to tiltrotor technology. 
Rather, "the friction lock on the collective slipped and the aircraft went into a steep dive." 
[Ref.24:p.177] Although a larger Model 2 variant was eventually attempted, the 
contract's schedule and competitiveness had fallen behind that of the XV-3 currently under 
development by Bell. [Ref.24:p.177] Work on the Transcendental Model 2 was ultimately 
canceled. Lichten ended his association with Guerierri and moved on to head up the 
tiltrotor program at Bell. [Ref.24:p.177] 
2. The Bell XV -3 
The Bell XV -3 proposal was a continuation of the Guerierri-Lichten tiltrotor 
design. [Ref.24:p.178] It was selected by the Army and Air Force for prototype 
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development as part of an industry-wide competition to explore the possibility of pursuing 
a new concept for observation and reconnaissance. More important, it "was also intended 
to provide design and test data for the development of larger, higher performance 
machines of this type." [Ref.23:p. 73] 
The first XV-3 was built in 1955. After about 2 months of hover tests and attempts 
to convert from the hover mode to forward flight, a "mechanical dynamic rotor instability 
or rotor weave" [Ref.27:p.9-7], resulted in a crash and loss of the aircraft. Following 
critical analysis of the cause of the accident, and a decision to build and test a second 
prototype, the modified XV -3 made its first complete conversion from the helicopter mode 
to cruise flight on December 17, 1958. [Ref.24:p.180] Rotor & Wing Magazine reported 
that "this was the world's first aircraft to convert from vertical to horizontal flight [fully] 
by rotating its props." [Ref.28:p.6] 
During the next seven years, further testing established the tiltrotor concept as a 
technically feasible advanced aviation alternative. As describe by Boeing's former 
Manager of V/STOL Technology, K.B. Gilmore: 
The feasibility of the tiltrotor concept was demonstrated in the late 1950s 
by the Bell XV -3. This was basically a testbed aircraft and while it 
successfully performed its purpose of substantiating feasibility, it also 
pointed out some fundamental technical problems of the tiltrotor 
configuration, especially in the dynamics area. [Ref.29:p.19-1] 
One of the "fundamental technical problems" that Gilmore failed to elaborate on was the 
phenomenon described earlier as "rotor weave." An additional technical problem specific 
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to the tiltrotor according to K.G. Wernicke, a Bell Engineer, is related to "the loss of 
vertical lift that the tiltrotor sustains due to the wing blocking some of the slipstream of 
the rotors." [Ref.30:p.3] Despite the inherent technical problems, as described by Rotor 
Magazine in 1992, the tiltrotor prototype had served its purpose, in that "the XV-3 was 
declared airworthy." [Ref.31:p.50] In 1966 the XV-3 was retired after accumulating 125 
flight hours and 110 conversions, during the course of 270 total flights. [Ref.31:p.50] 
Tiltrotor technology was ready for the next progressive leap in its evolution; a 
tiltrotor demonstration program. The XV -3 would prove particularly advantageous in 
preparing for that eventuality. As Rotor Magazine reported the event: "Following Phase 
II testing, the airframe was moved to NASA to finalize airframe configurations, and to use 
the XV-3 for future tiltrotor designs." [Ref.31:p.50] 
F. DEMONSTRATING TILTROTOR TECHNOLOGY: THE BELL XV-15 
So now that we have this technology (the XV-3), what are we going to do 
with it? .. The risk involved in introducing any new aircraft. .. is now so 
high ... the probability that the tiltrotor could be developed in one 
shot...from today's state of technology is very poor. If the technology we 
have developed is ever going to be applied to an operational aircraft, an 
intermediate flight step of a demonstrator aircraft or proof-of-concept 
vehicle which could be developed for a far more modest expenditure than 
a true operational prototype appears absolutely necessary. This aircraft 
must demonstrate far more than the feasibility aimed at in the XV-3 .. .It 
must provide an honest flight demonstration that all the technology is in 
fact at hand and it must substantiate the predicted benefits of the 
configuration. [Ref.29:p.19-4] 
Boeing's Gilmore presented his opinion several years before work was initiated on 
the Bell XV-15. However, it was a direct result of this perceived need by he and others, 
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that research involving tiltrotor technology took the course that it did after completion of 
the XV-3 program in 1966. 
During the next five years research was predominantly a joint effort between Bell, 
Boeing, NASA, the Army, and the Air Force. Most of the emphasis was focused on 
improving the dynamics, and identifying and reducing the instabilities discovered during 
XV-3 flight testing. During this same time frame a number of studies were conducted at 
the request of NASA to explore and evaluate the potential of the tiltrotor concept in several 
commercial applications. [Ref.24:p.181-182] 
As a result of the work completed on the XV-3, the Army and NASA were ready 
by 1972 to award a contract for development of a tiltrotor technology demonstrator 
aircraft. After design competition between both Bell and Boeing, Bell was selected to 
design and manufacture what was to become the Bell Model 300. [Ref.24:p.182] 
Subsequent improvements over the initial configuration were so extensive that Bell 
elected to redesignate the aircraft as the Model 301, and later the XV-15. [Ref.28:p.6] 
Engineering design was completed in March of 1975, and subsequent assembly of the first 
of two prototypes was accomplished between October of 1975 and May of 1976. 
[Ref.24:p.182-183] 
The XV -15 accomplished its first free hover on 3 May 1977. Later that same 
month, the aircraft underwent limited flight envelope testing of approximately three hours 
duration. The first in-flight partial conversion from 90 degrees (hover mode) to 5 degrees 
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forward took place on 5 May 1979. A graduated conversion schedule culminated with a 
full conversion being achieved on 24 July of that same year. [Ref.24:p.183-184] 
Schneider described the full conversion as a momentous occasion, and one of great 
importance in advancing the tiltrotor concept. Also, the evolution had given those 
involved in the program enough confidence "to approve a fairly rapid exploration of the 
XV-15's remaining flight envelope." [Ref.24:p.185] 
Cruise speeds of 300 knots and altitudes up to 21,000 feet were achieved in less 
than a year's time. The results supported a high degree of confidence in the safety and 
reliability of the prototype. More significant, according to Schneider, was the growing 
confidence on the part of those involved in the program that the XV -15 prototype design 
could successfully demonstrate the overall capability and versatility of tiltrotor technology. 
[Ref.24:p.186-187] 
The XV -15 represented a design that could move the tiltrotor concept closer toward 
eventual commercial innovation. This was the strategic role the XV -15 was envisioned and 
designed to fill. According to a Bell brochure, 
The XV -15 tiltrotor aircraft demonstrates the executive transport application 
of tiltrotor technology ... The XV -15 was developed under a 
NASA/Army/Bell research program as a tiltrotor concept demonstrator. 
[Ref.32] 
Technology demonstration is not new, nor unique in its application to the XV -15. 
As described by Bud Laughlin, Senior VP for Loral Vought, "technology demonstration 
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is used to influence not only the customers, but the decision makers as well; particularly 
those who control the money." [Ref.33] 
The notion that the XV -15 was developed as a "link" in the tiltrotor evolutionary 
process and not developed for operational use is indirectly confirmed in the findings of a 
1994 MV-22 Independent Risk Assessment (IRA) Team. When commenting on the 
adequacy of MV-22 structural design issues the report stated that "other aeroelastic 
phenomena are being addressed for the first time in this, the first tiltrotor aircraft [MV-22] 
intended for operational usage" [Ref.34:p.3]. 
Through various marketing techniques and well orchestrated exposure, the XV -15 
contributed to gaining both operator and public acceptance. For example, a "guest-pilot 
program" was initiated in 1981 to familiarize high-level military pilots and selected civilian 
pilots with the unique capabilities of the Bell XV-15 tiltrotor. [Ref.24:p.187] 
Each flight by a guest pilot consisted of a brief demonstration of helicopter, 
conversion, and airplane modes ... The guest pilot then took the controls and 
flew the aircraft. [Ref.24:p.187] 
Another phase of the demonstration effort took place in March 1982. An east coast 
demonstration tour was arranged for a cross-section of operational, technical, and decision 
making personnel. The tour "included seven flight demonstrations at six different 
locations in eight days." [Ref.24:p.187] 
As a result of emerging military requirements, and the capabilities demonstrated 
by the XV -15, the Defense Department was ready to explore tiltrotor technology for 
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military applications [Ref.24:p.190]. Additionally, it had long term implications for the 
possibility of commercial innovation of the tiltrotor concept. In fact, "Bell has taken the 
XV-15 on demonstration tours, even to New York City to allow commercial operators a 
glimpse of tiltrotor versatility." [Ref.28:p. 7] 
The Bell XV -15 had built on what the Transcendental Model 1-G and Bell XV -3 
had started over twenty years prior. It had reinforced and solidified the technical feasibility 
of the tiltrotor concept. [Ref.28:p.6] 
More significant was the contribution its guest pilot and technology demonstration 
programs had. Through dozens of individual and group flight demonstrations, culminating 
with a landing at the Capital on 25 April 1992, the XV-15 had served as the medium 
through which public acceptance of the tiltrotor concept could be gained. 
G. THE MARINE CORPS' SEARCH FOR AN AIRCRAFT 
Following World War II, the Marine Corps began exploring the possibility of 
employing V/STOL technology as part of their amphibious assault doctrine. Beginning 
in 1946, Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) began to develop the vertical 
.envelopment concept. Using HRP-1 helicopters, externally hung howitzers and supplies, 
as well as assault troops were delivered from ship to shore. With the addition of the HRP-
2, the Marines were able to prove that the employment of helicopters in large numbers was 
not only feasible, but desirable and advantageous. [Ref.24:p.190] 
Eventually the Navy developed dedicated helicopter assault ships to support this 
doctrinal change. The Marine Corps fielded the Boeing CH-46 helicopter in the mid-
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1960s specifically to satisfy the troop transport requirement. Unbeknownst to the Marines 
at the time, the CH-46 would remain their mainstay troop transport for over thirty years. 
[Ref.24:p.190] 
The Corps first explored a long term follow-on to the CH-46 as far back as 1968 
during the Medium Assault Study. The potential of V/STOL aircraft (other than rotary-
wing) to fill this requirements void once vacated by the CH-46, was vigorously studied 
under programs such as the Medium V/STOL Study. Tiltrotor technology, the advancing 
blade concept, even tilt fans had been explored. The other services had their evolving 
requirements as well. [Ref.24:p.190] 
Around this same time, work had begun on the Bell XV -15 by the Bell-NASA-
Army team. As a result of XV -15 development and its tiltrotor technology demonstration 
program, the Joint Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX) Program was launched. [Ref.24:p.190] 
The JVX program did not survive in its original form, and was later re-designated 
as the Joint Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft or JVMX. Through the Defense 
acquisition process, the MV -22 Osprey was determined to be the best solution for that joint 
requirement. [Ref. 35] 
The JVMX program, and therefore the MV-22, is an outgrowth of the work done 
on both the XV-3 and XV-15. As explained in the CTR Industrial Base Impact Study, 
The V-22 program is based on tested technology ... The DOD sponsored 
research and development began with the Bell-designed XV -3 in the mid 
1950s. The XV-15 program, jointly sponsored by the Army, Navy, and 
NASA conclusively confirmed the validity of the tiltrotor concept in the 
1970s. XV-15 aircraft have logged over 600 hours of flight time and have 
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demonstrated the suitability of the tiltrotor for military missions. The V -22 
production program is the logical development of these endeavors and the 
culmination of 30 years of tiltrotor research and development by the U.S. 
Government and American industry. [Ref.2:p.47] 
This quote is somewhat dated. However, the main point is timeless. A link 
between the JVMX and previous Defense involvement in tiltrotor development is 
acknowledged. 
This relationship is also supported by some entities charged with evaluating the 
health of the MV -22 program. Nora Slatkin, the former Navy Acquisition Executive, 
assembled an MV-22 Independent Risk Assessment (IRA) Team several years ago. Their 
goal was to assess Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) issues impacting 
on two intermediate program milestones. In reporting the results of their assessment in 
August of 1994 the team: 
Found it necessary to go beyond the immediate bounds of the EMD 
program. It is useful, for example, to consider the EMD as Phase IV of a 
weapon system acquisition program: 
Phase 1: XV-15 
Phase 2: FSD 
Phase 3: Interregnum 
Phase 4: EMD [Ref.34:p.8] 
The IRA Team's comments underscore the contributions the XV-15 technology 
demonstration program made in establishing the foundation on which the V -22 program 
is built. 
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H. THE BELL-BOEING MV -22 OSPREY 
According to the Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR), the MV -22 will 
provide the joint services with a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable, medium lift, 
vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft to perform various missions for the year 2001 
and beyond [Ref. 35]. 
In December 1981, the Department of Defense formally began the MV-22 
procurement process, when it directed the Concept Exploration (CE) of a multi-service, 
advance vertical lift aircraft. In June 1982, the services signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on the JVMX, designating the Army as the executive service. 
[Ref.36] 
In December 1982, a Milestone I Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC) review was held, rendering a favorable report on the JVMX program. This was 
followed by a Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum approving the JVMX 
acquisition strategy, and requesting competitive proposals for development. [Ref.36] 
By May 1983, the Army, faced with other acquisition priorities, relinquished their 
executive service status to the Navy [Ref. 36]. A Joint Technology Assessment Group 
(JT AG) concluded that tiltrotor technology offered the best solution for a multi-service 
aircraft. The Bell-Boeing team submitted the only proposal in response to the Request For 
Proposal (RFP). As a result, a $69 million Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract was 
awarded to Bell-Boeing in April, 1983, based on their preliminary design of the JVMX 
aircraft. [Ref. 36] 
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In 1984 the RFP for EMD was released and once again Bell-Boeing was the lone 
respondent. In January 1985, the JVMX was formally redesignated the V-22 Osprey 
(later, the MV-22 Osprey). Following the Milestone II DSARC review, EMD was 
approved in May 1986. Once again a contract was signed with Bell-Boeing. The 
contractors stood to share a greater percentage of the risk during this phase however, with 
the signing of a Fixed Price contract. [Ref.36] 
From fiscal years 1986 through 1991, Congress appropriated approximately $2.7 
billion for the MV -22 program, the majority of which ($2.2 billion) was for research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). Despite opposition from the Secretary of 
Defense, Congressional support kept the program funded. [Ref.37] In 1988, Bell-Boeing 
completed the first MV-22 prototype, and begun the lengthy evaluation process. In 
March, 1989 the first successful flight was conducted. [Ref.36] 
Shrinking Defense budgets once again brought the wrath of Defense Secretary Dick 
Cheney, who canceled the MV-22 program in April 1989. The Navy immediately 
responded with a reclama, and through intensive lobbying efforts, particularly by the 
Marine Corps, gathered enough backing for a congressional resolution that successfully 
reinstated the program later that same month. [Ref.37] 
In April 1990 the first DOD flight evaluation was successfully completed. The first 
flight related setback occurred in June 1991, when test aircraft #5 crashed while 
conducting hover tests at Wilmington Delaware. The flight crew walked away unharmed. 
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As reported in the August 1991 edition of Rotor and Wing, the cause of the mishap 
was said to be due to the incorrect manufacturing of a flight control system component. 
[Ref.38:p.23-26] Perhaps a more accurate accounting of the cause was that it was due to 
"improper wiring of roll rate sensors in the primary flight control system that caused the 
pilot control inputs to get out of phase with the aircraft." [Ref.13:p.33] 
There has also been speculation concerning the possibility of a compounding factor 
attributable to pilot error. This has been linked to the aircraft's fixed-wing power quadrant 
configuration, requiring somewhat opposite pilot control inputs from that normally 
associated with helicopter flight. [Ref.18] Regardless, the cause was not linked to tiltrotor 
unique technology, as reflected in the Rotor & Wing article's title; "Not A Killing Blow." 
[Ref.38] 
A fatal crash occurred just over a year later in July 1992. During arrival of aircraft 
#4 at Marine Corps Air Facility, Quantico Virginia, a fire broke out in one of the engine 
nacelles, causing the aircraft to plunge into the Potomac. Though nearly 780 flight hours 
had been amassed to that point, that crash which killed all occupants aboard, effectively 
brought the program to a halt [Ref.37]. 
Serious questions were again raised, at both OSD and in Congress, as to whether 
the MV-22 was "the" solution to the Marine Corps' operational requirement. Alternatives 
to the Osprey, such as conventional helicopters were suggested by OSD, and the topic of 
much of the Congressional debate. [Ref.37] 
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Many observers are under the perception that the post-mishap Congressional debate 
centered around technical issues, regarding whether or not the MV-22 was technically 
feasible to produce, and safe to operate. In reality, the discussions focused on funding. 
It was not a question as to whether or not the technical questions could be answered. 
Rather, it was whether or not the technical questions could be addressed within the 
schedule and financial constraints mandated by Secretary Cheney and Congress. [Ref.37] 
This is clearly evident in Congressional subcommittee dialogue between then Acting 
Secretary of the Navy, Sean O'Keefe, and Representative Les Asp in, former Chairman of 
the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee: 
The CHAIRMAN. It is the provisions then, in the appropriation bill that 
are 'engineeringly' unworkable, in particular, the 1996 date; is that what 
you are saying? Is that the part that is unworkable? 
Mr. O'KEEFE. The project manager and the engineers involved in the 
program suggest that the combination of three different events in the statute 
is what is the show-stopper. The first is a requirement for a production 
representative aircraft which they determine to require on the order of about 
a 44 month production time frame. Second, there is a further requirement 
that it be tested by a certain date which cannot be accomplished in that 
window. The third feature is that $790 million will not get you that 
program. [Ref.37:p.6] 
In the simplest of terms, LtCol John Dillard, a military lecturer in the Acquisition 
curriculum at the Naval Post Graduate School, may have best described the environment 
in which Defense weapons systems are developed. Dillard stated unequivocally that 
"invention within a schedule is hard." [Ref.39] 
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Representative Beverly Byron of Maryland, may have captured the essence of what 
the Congressional activity was all about, when she emphasized that "the reason that we are 
looking at a helicopter option is the cost." [Ref.37:p.22] Once again the program eluded 
cancellation. 
In January 1993 ground testing resumed. Flight testing followed that August. As 
of December 1995 MV-22 pre-production test aircraft had amassed over 1079 flight hours 
in 939 flights [Ref.40:p.4]. Approval to award Advanced Acquisition Contracts (AACs) 
for the first Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lot was granted on 7 February 1996. 
Along with it, came authorization for $48 million in long-lead procurement. Production 
is anticipated to begin sometime in FY -97, with first deliveries going to the Marine Corps 
during FY-99. [Ref.36] 
A discussion of the potential impact of MV-22 technologies and materials on CTR 
derivatives will discussed separately in Chapter V. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter has recounted the history of tiltrotor research and development. The 
concept of vertical flight is as old as conventional flight. Defense sponsored tiltrotor 
research and development began in the early 1950s. Four prototype aircraft have been 
developed and flown, with varying degrees of success: the Transcendental Models 1-G 
and 2, the Bell XV-3, the Bell XV-15, and the Bell-Boeing MV-22 Osprey. Over the span 
of approximately 30 years and two generations of tiltrotor aircraft, the three historical 
barriers addressed in Chapter II were influenced by the following three contributions: 
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1. Government leadership and funding of tiltrotor research and development. 
2. Proving the tiltrotor concept technically feasible. 
3. Providing tiltrotor technology demonstration. [Refs.24 and 28] 
These previous efforts however, have had little influence in addressing the barriers 
associated with lack of a supporting infrastructure and systems integration [Refs.2 and 20]. 
Though still an advanced concept, in that this technology has never been operationally 
fielded, 
Tiltrotor technology is a mature technology unique to the United States. 
The V -22 production program is the logical development of these 
endeavors. [Ref.2:p.47] 
Next, Chapter IV will present research pertaining specifically to initiatives 
involving the CTR. Potential CTR applications and their marketability will be explored 
and discussed. Next, previously conducted studies regarding the feasibility and viability 
of applications will be addressed. Finally, any barriers precluding CTR applications will 
be identified and discussed. 
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IV. THE POTENTIAL MARKET FOR CIVIL TILTROTOR APPLICATIONS 
This chapter assesses the overall potential for commercial application of tiltrotor 
technology. Considerable market analysis in this area has previously been conducted. 
To ultimately address whether CTR applications are dependent on MV-22 
development, it is first necessary to examine the market for the CTR. In doing so, barriers 
that inhibit market introduction can be identified. The existence of these barriers, and the 
degree to which they can be satisfied or overcome, can provide the necessary link in 
establishing that dependence. 
The chapter begins by providing a brief summary of various markets examined 
during a number of tiltrotor studies. Overall, according to the first of these studies 
completed in 1987, the tiltrotor is considered to possess "a large market potential." 
[Ref.41:p.2] However, the preponderance of the research will be confined to the "high 
density" or "short-haul" commercial passenger market. This will be done in order to 
provide focus, and more important, because this area is considered to possess the greatest 
potential for market penetration [Ref.41]. 
By way of introduction, the short-haul passenger market will be preceded by a 
discussion of the congestion problem our National Aviation System (NAS) is currently 
experiencing, and some of its root causes. Similar difficulties are being experienced in 
foreign markets. 
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Next, the sequence in which the tiltrotor concept came under consideration as a 
solution to the problem, will be reviewed. This will include a discussion of the expected 
method of employing the tiltrotor in the short-haul passenger environment. Experts 
testifying before Congress believe that employment of the tiltrotor in this fashion, holds 
revolutionary potential for solving the congestion problem [Ref.l]. 
Finally, four key tiltrotor studies will be identified and discussed. Each study 
addresses various aspects and considerations concerning the short-haul commercial 
passenger market. An overview of each study's findings and recommendations will be 
provided. The focus of this effort will be the identification and discussion of the barriers, 
risks, and issues highlighted in the four studies. It is considered vital that all these 
concerns be addr~ssed and overcome to varying degrees, before implementation of a CTR 
system can be cons ide red practical. [Refs. 1 , 13 and 41] 
A. POTENTIAL CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS 
The following section addresses the "most promising areas of potential 
commerciai application." [Ref.41:p.8] The short-haul commercial passenger market, will 
be addressed separately. Other potential applications include, but are not limited to the 
areas identified in Figure 2. 
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User Groups: 
Vehicle Applications: 
* Corporate/Executive 
* Commercial Operators 
* Civil Government 
* Offshore Oil 
*Other 
* High Density 
Passenger 
* Cargo/Package 
Express 
* Developing Region 
* Resource Development 
* Corporate/Executive 
* Public Service 
Figure 2. Potential Markets for CTR Applications. [Ref.41:p.8] 
A brief discussion of some of the more prominent applications follows: 
1. Corporate/Executive Travel 
Most Fortune 500 companies operate a number of aircraft for their top executives 
and leading customers. Many operate both helicopters and jets. Some have operations so 
extensive that they even have a separate vice president for air operations. Georgia Institute 
of Technology's Clifford McKeithan describes the current "typical" scenario of moving 
a company executive from company headquarters to a manufacturing plant in the conduct 
of required business: 
A company helicopter picks him up at company headquarters and flies him 
to the regional airport. There he boards the company jet and flies a few 
hundred miles to an airport near the plant. Another helicopter takes him to 
the plant for his meeting. In this situation, which is quite common, the 
company uses three aircraft to accomplish the task. 
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With a corporate tiltrotor, a single crew and a single aircraft could transport 
the executive from headquarters to the plant. What speed advantage the jet 
possessed was lost, by the time required to fly by helicopter on both ends 
of the journey and to change modes. Tiltrotor aircraft could provide many 
of these companies the capability of improving the service and efficiency 
of their air operations. The tiltrotor offers corporate users speed, comfort, 
flexibility, and the ability to operate a single aircraft. [Ref.l :p.117] 
2. Civil/Public Applications 
This umbrella category includes such areas as drug enforcement, Coast Guard, 
border patrol, police, fire, disaster relief, and medical transport. This is certain not to 
include all the possible missions and roles, but it reflects a large cross-section of those 
looked at in the initial study. The advantages of tiltrotor introduction into applications like 
those mentioned are considerable. [Ref.41] 
Take drug enforcement as one example. As described by McKeithan, 
A typical air mission consists of three phases: detection, surveillance and 
tracking, and interception and arrest. Generally, a long range, long 
endurance airplane such as a Falcon or a P-3 with radar is used for the 
detection phase. Once a suspected airborne smuggling operation is detected, 
a high speed turboprop or jet airplane is vectored by the radar aircraft to 
intercept and follow the smuggler. When the smuggler lands, trucks are 
often driven onto the runway to prevent the chase aircraft from landing . .It 
is therefore necessary, as soon as a landing location(s) is postulated, to 
vector helicopters bearing DEA agents to the site to capture and arrest the 
smugglers and confiscate the illegal drugs. In this scenario, a minimum of 
three, and often more are used to complete the operation. The use of a 
tiltrotor aircraft for this mission has the obvious advantage of using a single 
aircraft for the entire three phases. The tiltrotor can mount the necessary 
radar for detection, it has the speed to intercept and follow most aircraft, 
and it can land without a runway to deliver the DEA agents. The tiltrotor 
can be a powerful tool in the fight against illegal drugs. [Ref. 1 :p. 119] 
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3. Offshore Oil/ Resource Development 
McKeithan writes: 
The off-shore oil industry has a unique problem. The workers on the oil 
rigs are paid premium wages from the time they board transportation to the 
rigs until they return to shore ... The oil companies presently use helicopters 
for the task ... At the further ranges, the helicopter becomes economically 
infeasible. Until now, no viable alternative existed. However, with twice 
the speed and twice the range of the helicopter, the tiltrotor can provide a 
reasonable means of transporting these workers, minimizing the amount of 
premium wages that must be paid for non-productive transport time. 
[Ref.l:p.118] 
In regards to resource development, he adds: 
Remote areas of the United States, such as Alaska, possess untold quantities 
of precious resources that cannot be developed or exploited due to a lack 
of a viable transportation system .. .In areas that need to be developed, the 
lower cost of construction of a vertiport over an airport, can easily offset 
the cost differential of acquiring and operating the [tiltrotor] aircraft. 
[Ref.l :p.ll8] 
4. Cargo/Package Express 
Package express service continues to grow. However operations are beginning to 
experience difficulty in getting packages from the pickup point to departure airports 
because of the ground congestion. As described by Federal Express Managing Director 
John Finley, in this application the tiltrotor appears to provide its most value when 
operated in a city center to city center mode. [Ref.l :p.49] 
B. THE PROBLEM WITH AIRPORT CONGESTION 
We know that the congestion and delay problems that we are now 
experiencing at our major airports will only get worse. It is estimated that 
the U.S. air passenger traffic will probably double within the next ten 
years. Yet, we are limited in our ability to meet this added growth in air 
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travel. We are limited by the air space that is available, by the ability to 
expand current airports, and by our ability to build new airports. 
[Ref.l :p. 9] 
[Congressman Pete Geren before House hearings on civil tiltrotor 
applications research.] 
Congressman Geren's statement underscores the serious problems we are 
experiencing with the current and future capacity of our commercial transportation system. 
1. Context of the Problem 
By the end of the century, total forecasted growth in enplanements in the United 
States is expected to exceed 74% [Ref.1:p.78]. By that same time, air travel in Western 
Europe is expected to come to "a near standstill". Similar trouble is anticipated in Japan. 
[Ref.1 :p. 78 
Right now, 21 primary airports each experience over 20,000 hours in annual 
delays, costing both airlines and the businesses effected by them, at least $5 billion a year. 
By 1997 33 airports are expected to be effected to that same degree. [Ref.42:p.24] By the 
year 2000 that figure is expected to climb to 58 [Ref.41:p.28]. 
2. Principal Causes 
In general, this problem exists because as General Magnus points out, "although 
other advanced industrialized nations have good usage and capacity on their rail and bus 
systems, American demand has continued to decline for these modes while it increased for 
personal auto and commercial air travel". [Ref.43 :p .1] 
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The major cause according to a 1991 study is that "many people are flying 
relatively short distances on relatively small aircraft" [Ref.44:p.2]. As Bell's Horner 
points out, "air travel is principally a short haul business" [Ref.1:p.89]. On average, 
according to McKeithan, 41% of all arrivals at the ten busiest U.S. airports originate from 
less than 300 miles away [Ref.1 :p. 111]. Figure 3 provides a breakout of those arrivals 
by city. 
Percent of Arrivals from Cities less than 300 miles 
~ Percentage 
ATL 32 
BOS 74 
DEN 15 
DFW 28 
JFK 50 
LAX 40 
LGA 48 
MIA 28 
ORO 42 
SFO 53 
Figure 3. Short Range Arrivals at Ten Busiest U.S. Airports. [Ref.1 :p .111] 
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In fact, 75% of all passenger flights are conducted within a 500 mile radius [Ref.1 :p. 90]. 
According to Port Authority's Muldoon, in the New York area, "commuter aircraft 
currently represent 19 percent of the total traffic, but accommodate only three percent of 
the passengers" [Ref.1:p.60]. In terms of just departures from the New York area 
airports, 44% are carrying only 18% of the total passengers, less than 300 miles 
[Ref.1:p.60]. A similar situation exists in Atlanta, where according to McKeithan, 44% 
of all arrivals and departures carry only 19% of the total passengers [Ref.1:p.104]. 
Combine all these factors and according to Horner, "a principal reason for congestion is 
that short haul and long haul aircraft use the same runway space" [Ref.1:p.90]. 
Add to the air congestion problem, the increased passenger flow to and from the 
airports along our cities' highways. As pointed out by the American Helicopter Society's 
Flater, "the roadways while they were ample for traffic, oh, 10 or 20 years ago, they now 
accommodate a volume which far exceeds their design capacity" [Ref.1:p.29]. 
C. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 
According to General Magnus, an increase in the capability of our National 
Aviation System to handle this escalating demand can be achieved in four ways: 
1. Expansion of existing airports or construction of new facilities. 
2. Enhancements in the Air traffic Control System (ATCS). 
3. Use of larger conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft. 
4. Use of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL) that can operate 
independent of conventional airport facilities. [Ref.43:p.1-2] 
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The first two options are generally considered the most difficult and expensive to 
achieve. As Congressman Geren explains: "expansion of our existing infrastructure is 
very expensive." [Ref.1 :p.4] Even if funding were not the primary concern, Geren goes 
on to describe other key issues that: "because of the opposition of neighbors, because of 
the noise pollution, because of the growth in and around these airports--make it very 
difficult for them to expand." [Ref.l:p.4] 
Larger CTOL aircraft are highly impractical for operations at the majority of 
secondary "feeder" and municipal airports. These facilities account for a large percentage 
of the route connections to and from the focal points of the congestion, but are often 
unable to accommodate a larger class aircraft. [Ref.13] 
The use of V/STOL aircraft has generated the most attention. Flater believes 
employing such a concept "could increase the capacity of our existing airports by 30 
percent or more without spending another dollar of our scarce revenues" [Ref.1:p.30]. 
McKeithan puts that estimate at about 23% [Ref. I :p. 111]. 
Prior to 1973, a number of Government and industry studies explored the potential 
of various V/STOL concepts for use in relieving the congestion, and improving the 
regional transportation system. However, as a result of the fuel crisis, the Government's 
push for fuel efficiency, and the inefficiencies of most V/STOL designs, the conduct of 
these studies was drastically curtailed. [Ref.41:p.9] 
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Though V/STOL configurations using other than rotors or propellers have been 
studied, for a number of reasons, they have generally been dismissed as impractical for 
commercial purposes. [Ref.25:p.122-124] 
One significant reason discussed in Chapter III, was that working against the 
potential benefits of most configurations "are the increased fuel requirements of low speed 
and hovering flight" [Ref.22:p. 7]. Another disqualifier in the commercial environment 
may be that: 
The tremendously hot exhaust also pose several problems with takeoff and 
landing. A minor one was the possibility of damage to the landing surface. 
[Ref.25:p.123] 
This notion is supported by the restrictive requirements under which the A V -8 
Harrier must operate. Other problems with commercial application of these configurations 
include gust sensitivity, and handling qualities. [Ref.27:p.9-3 and 9-4] 
In 1983, an FAA-sponsored program determined that the conventional helicopter 
was an unsatisfactory choice for satisfying this requirement. The study's findings indicated 
that this was due to "a lack of capacity, high operational costs, and high noise levels." 
[Ref.42] But there's more obvious reasons why the helicopter is ill-suited in this role. 
Hellman maintains that the helicopter is really only practical for what is often termed 
"ultra-short haul." [Ref.25:p. 73] This primarily involves operations from city-center to 
local airports and back. "Ten or twenty miles being the average." [Ref.25 :p. 73] This is 
also supported by McKeithan who explained that "the limited speed and range of the 
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helicopter has limited its potential for city-center to city-center transportation." 
[Ref.1:p.112] 
D. THE TILTROTOR AS A SOLUTION 
Beginning in 1976, two X-15s were built as tiltrotor technology demonstrators. 
This fuel efficient design (by V/STOL standards) improved on previous developmental 
efforts begun in the 1950s by the Transcendental and XV-3 prototypes. The XV-15 began 
performing its intended role in 1981. Development of the MV-22 was also initiated that 
year. [Refs.24 and 36] 
Coincidence or not, over the past 15 years, users of commercial and civil aircraft 
have begun to realize the tiltrotor's vast potential. Not only for application in short-haul 
commercial passenger service, but in a myriad of other markets as well [Refs.1, 41,43 
and 44]. 
Approximately ten years ago, a series of new studies began. Though similar in 
purpose, these new efforts have focused exclusively on tiltrotor technology to satisfy short-
haul commercial requirements, as opposed to the entire spectrum of V/STOL 
configurations. [Refs.41 and 44] 
Commercial use of the tiltrotor is still an advanced aviation concept, in that, there 
has never been a variant, military or commercial, in operational service. The technology 
itself however, is considered proven and mature based on over 40 years of Defense 
research and development. [Refs.2, 24, 28, 29, 31 and 37] 
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E. TILTROTOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE SHORT-HAUL PASSENGER 
MARKET 
Several experts put the end result of these short-haul related congestion problems 
in terms that the traveling passenger can relate to. Hellman reveals that studies conducted 
over 25 years ago by the Port of New York Authority were already showing the effects 
of the problem. These studies showed that "travelers using short-haul jetliners average 
only 76 mph on a city-center to city-center trip between New York and Washington--and 
only 66 mph between Chicago and Detroit" [Ref.25:p.70-71] 
McKeithan provides a more recent New York scenario: 
From downtown Manhattan, the traveler can expect to spend approximately 
35 - 50 dollars and 45 minutes for a cab ride to LaGuardia airport. Since 
most of the business travel from our major cities is of lengths of less than 
300 miles, the traveler spends more time in ground transit than in the air. 
[Ref.1 :p.112] 
The tiltrotor is envisioned to be most advantageous in the range from 50 to 300-500 
miles [Refs.25, 41 and 44]. This happens to be the range within which, the current short-
haul carriers, shown to be the root cause of the congestion problem, also operate. [Refs. 
1, 41, 43 and 44] Short-haul service can sub-divided into three different types of services 
or travel: 
1. Vertiport -to-Vertiport 
2. Feeder 
3. Transfer [Refs.13 and 44]] 
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Vertiport-to-vertiport service involves origin to destination service between two 
metropolitan areas. Feeder service involves travel between vertiports and secondary 
airports outside metropolitan areas. Transfer service involves connecting either vertiport 
or feeder airport travelers with long distance service. [Refs.13 and 44] 
The helicopter is still seen as viable when used locally for feeder and transfer 
service. The tiltrotor can certainly fill these requirements as well. However, the 
tiltrotor's real solution lies in its ability to eliminate the use of airports all together, or in 
intra-city vertiport-to-vertiport service. As explained by General Magnus, these aircraft 
"using a network of small facilities (vertiports), may prove attractive and profitable by 
replacing existing CTOL aircraft on short-haul routes ... in heavily trafficked corridors, 
opening up the time slots presently required by these short-haul CTOL aircraft for 
additional capacity for long-haul CTOL aircraft." [Ref.43:p.2] As described by Hellman, 
"their (the tiltrotor) greatest promise lies in their ability to bring the airport to where the 
people are, rather than vice versa." [Ref.25:p.74] 
Figure 4 depicts the comparative total times for different combinations of 
transportation modes, required to transport a traveler from city-center to city-center, a 
distance of 200 miles. The tiltrotor by comparison, is both more efficient and effective 
in accomplishing this task. [Refs. I, 25, 41, 43 and 44] 
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Figure 4. Comparative Times for Railroad, Fixed Wing and VTOL for a 200-Mile 
City-Center-to-City-Center Trip. [Ref.25 :p. 75] 
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F. MARKET STUDIES OF CIVIL TILTROTOR POTENTIAL 
Numerous studies on the potential of V/STOL technology to alleviate the airport 
congestion problem have been conducted over the years. A review of four of the market 
studies completed since 1987, specifically addressing the tiltrotor in this role will be 
reviewed. A summary of the most significant findings, barriers or issues, and 
recommendations contained in those reports follows. More detailed information in regards 
to each study is provided in Appendix B. 
1. Civil Tiltrotor Missions and Applications- Phase I 
In 1985, the FAA Administrator proposed a joint civil tiltrotor study with NASA 
and DOD. The study was contracted out and completed by Boeing, Bell Textron, and 
Boeing Vertol in July of 1987. The study examined the potential for employment of 
tiltrotor technology across a wide range of applications. Those applications were discussed 
earlier in this chapter. 
The major finding reached in the study was that, overall, the civil tiltrotor has large 
market potential, particularly in the short-haul passenger market [Ref.41]. 
Concerning this specific market, as opposed to other modes of air transportation, tiltrotors 
offered better potential to improve interurban air transport service [Ref.41]. 
The study also identified potential barriers to implementation, and risk areas that 
required attention. They included gaining public acceptance, technical validation, and 
ensuring economic competitiveness. The most significant issue concerned the need to 
develop a supporting infrastructure. [Ref.41] 
73 
As a result of the Phase I study's findings, the primary recommendation was the 
development of a National Plan for a tiltrotor transportation system. It called for a joint 
effort between the FAA, NASA, DOD, and Industry. [Ref.41] Other specific 
recommendations included development of a tiltrotor technology demonstration program, 
and that CTR development be keyed off of the MV-22 program [Ref.41]. 
2. Civil Tiltrotor Missions and Applications Phase TI 
Completed in February 1991, the Phase II study expounded on the research 
conducted in the initial Phase I study. However, its focus was limited exclusively to the 
"high density," short-haul market identified previously as having the greatest market 
potential [Ref.41]. 
The overall finding was that in the short-haul market "a commercial tiltrotor is both 
technically feasible and economically competitive" [Ref.44:p.i]. Additionally, commercial 
tiltrotors could ease congestion and extend the useful life of existing airports. [Ref.44] 
Major barriers and issues effecting successful CTR introduction included the 
difficulty of validating the technology for commercial applications, and that both operators 
and travelers will demand the technology be proven. Once again, the most important 
revelation was that development of a CTR was not sufficient. The need for a supporting 
air/ground infrastructure was deemed critical. [Ref.44] 
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The study's findings, and the barriers and issues identified, led to agency specific, 
recommended responsibilities. The most significant were: 
General 
* Formation of public-private partnership to pursue national tiltrotor plan. 
* Department of Transportation to lead. 
* Continue NASA/FAA/Industry cooperation. 
NASA 
* Sponsor technology demonstration program using: 
1. MV-22s. 
2. Upgraded XV-15. 
3. Simulators. 
* Expedite acquisition of MV-22 engineering test data. [Ref.44] 
3. "Eurostudy"; A European Regional Transportation Study 
A third major study was the Eurostudy which was a detailed examination of the 
potential for a regional European tiltrotor transportation system conducted in 1992. Those 
conducting the research included Bell Textron, Boeing Helicopters and Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Group, Alenia, British Aerospace, and Dornier. 
The major finding reached in the study was that potentially, there was substantial 
demand for a European tiltrotor, but that demand was highly sensitive to fare levels. 
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[Ref.45:p.4] The study also pointed out that the military MV-22 provides the necessary 
technology base [Ref.45]. 
The most significant barrier to successful introduction of a European CTR is th~ 
heavy reliance on rail transportation. This will require a major paradigm shift in European 
thinking. [Ref.45] Other significant barriers include: 
* Infrastructure components need to precede or accompany CTR development. 
* Civil acceptance awaits military MV-22 operational experience. [Ref.45] 
The study posed only two recommendations for the require "next steps"; one 
general and one specific: 
* 
* 
4. 
Industry and European Government cooperation. 
A demonstration program may be needed. [Ref.45] 
Civil Tiltrotor Development Advisory Committee (CTRDAC) Report 
to Congress 
Under Section 135 of the Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise 
Improvement, and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992 (PL102-5810), the U.S. 
Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to establish a Civil Tiltrotor 
Development Advisory Committee (CTRDAC). [Ref.l3] In October of 1992 a 
Congressional mandate required the committee to examine the costs, technical feasibility, 
and economic viability of integrating CTR aircraft into our national transportation system. 
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This committee, comprised of representatives from public, private, and industry concerns, 
held their first meeting on 20 May 1994. The committee's mandate was based on the 
following realities: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
National airspace congestion problem. 
Previously conducted tiltrotor market studies. 
Commercial interest in the tiltrotor concept as a result of V -22 development, 
and on-going NASA research. 
U.S. preeminence in tiltrotor research and development. [Ref.l3] 
A key goal of the committee was to assess how aircraft and infrastructure 
development costs should be allocated between Government and industry. The report to 
Congress was completed in December 1995. [Ref.13] 
The major finding reached by the CTRDAC was that the CTR system's success is 
contingent upon overcoming significant risks and uncertainties [Ref.l3]. The majority of 
the risks and uncertainties are associated with the fact that: 
* 
* 
No one agency controls the resources necessary for CTR system development. 
Decisions to manufacture CTRs, develop air/ground infrastructure, and 
operate services are interdependent. [Ref.l3] 
A significant number of barriers, risks, and issues were addressed in the report. 
They can best be summarized and categorized under the five historic barriers presented in 
Chapter II: 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Public/User acceptance regarding CTR safety and aircraft noise levels. 
Technical Risks associated with civil technology validation and FAA aircraft 
certification. 
Financial Risks involving high capital costs, and expenditures required to meet 
certification requirements. 
Infrastructure delays effect potential investment. 
Systems integration problem associated with resource control and decision 
authority. [Ref.l3] 
In regards to the committee's recommendations, two stand out as being most 
significant. They are: 
* 
* 
* 
Creation of public/private partnership to coordinate all issues pertaining to a 
CTR transportation system, particularly infrastructure development. 
Initiation of a tiltrotor aircraft/system demonstration program to: 
1. Assess community/operator acceptance. 
2. Evaluate environmental impact. 
3. Gain operational experience. 
Proceed with an integrated, 10 year, CTR aircraft and infrastructure program 
(research, development, test, and demonstration). [Ref.l3] 
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5. Synopsis, Interpretation, and Expansion of Market Studies 
The NASA/FAA sponsored Phase I study identified several market segments, the 
largest of which was for a 36-45 passenger tiltrotor in the "high density" or short-haul 
commercial passenger market. [Ref.41] The Phase II effort focused on the economic 
performance and potential world wide market demand for a 40 passenger vehicle, 
exclusively in the previously identified short-haul market. [Ref.44] 
Additionally, in the second study, market demand was examined in four U.S. 
corridors, the Northeast showing the strongest potential. This included vertiport-to-
vertiport, feeder, and transfer requirements. A "lower bound" forecast for the number of 
aircraft required to support the market potential was constructed. This lower bound 
consisted of vertiport-to-vertiport and feeder requirements for the four corridors. Transfer 
requirements were added to obtain an "upper bound." [Ref.44] The number of aircraft 
produced to support U.S. demand based on this criteria, along with worldwide demand in 
the year 2010, is presented later. 
The "Eurostudy" evaluated a 40 seat tiltrotor against the competition from the 
emerging high-speed rail system. Dependent on fare levels, an estimated 130 to 1200 
CTRs could be called for by 2010. [Ref.45] 
A Japanese market study, now underway, is due out later this year. Hence, it was 
not summarized here. Preliminary feedback indicates a Japanese market for approximately 
300 to 400 aircraft [Ref.l3]. 
79 
CTRDAC world market projections, for the year 2010, factor in those aircraft 
required to support other potential applications identified in the Phase I study. Again using 
a lower and upper bound, this latest research on worldwide demand for a 40 seat tiltrotor 
is contained in Figure 5. [Ref.13] 
Market Region 
Four major U.S. Corridors 
Other North American Corridors 
Europe 
Japan 
Oceania 
Total Short Haul 
Other applications 
Total 
CTR Forecast Range 
235- 325 
150- 200 
300- 400 
300-400 
100- 125 
1085- 1450 
75- 150 
1160- 1600 
Figure 5. Worldwide Demand Forecast for 40 Seat CTR in 2010. [Ref.13:p.64] 
There are numerous barriers, risks, and unresolved issues highlighted in each of 
the studies. To varying degrees, all must be addressed in order to successfully field CTRs 
in profitable quantities for both manufactures and operators. These barriers must also be 
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addressed in order for the CTR to have a favorable impact on the short-haul passenger 
market. Four major barriers were highlighted in the tiltrotor market studies. They are: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Public acceptance 
Technical Risks 
Financial Risks 
Lack of a supporting infrastructure [Refs .13, 41, 44 and 45] 
Though eluded to, but not specifically mentioned in the other studies, the CTRDAC 
adds systems integration as a fifth [Ref.13]. Dr. Robert Rosen of NASA also spoke of a 
CTR systems barrier. During Congressional testimony on CTR applications Rosen 
maintained that the major barrier to introduction of the CTR is "difficulty with the 
development of the overall system." [Ref.1 :p.135] 
In addition to their applicability to the CTR, the reader may recall that these five 
barriers are historic in nature, and were discussed in detail in Chapter II. The reader may 
also recall that the last two barriers were associated with the attempted introduction of the 
helicopter into the short-haul commercial passenger market. These two barriers were seen 
as the primary reasons for the helicopter's limited success [Ref.2 and 20]. 
To realize the full potential of the CTR, the required infrastructure must 
accompany the aircraft's introduction. There are numerous considerations that must be 
addressed in providing for that full potential. For example, a CTR system can only 
operate profitably when supported by a network of vertiports designed to handle commuter 
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service in large quantities. In 1990, Boeing's Renouard estimated each vertiport would 
require a four to five acre area in order to accommodate the anticipated volume of CTR 
traffic. [Ref.1]. In 1995, the CTRDAC put that estimate at 20 to 30 acres [Ref.13]. The 
use of existing, significantly smaller heliports in and around our cities, would not suffice. 
Terminal area instrument approach capabilities must also be considered, 
particularly during inclement weather. Carriers cannot profit if they cease operations due 
to Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). 
The real issue in regards to the systems integration problem, is one of commitment. 
The CTRDAC begins to shed light on this. It writes: 
A manufacturer will only launch a CTR program when it believes it can sell 
enough units over a short enough period of time at a price sufficient to 
cover investment and manufacturing costs while earning a return on the 
capital employed. [Ref.13:p.62] 
However, as the CTRDAC goes on to explain: 
A CTR launch decision is not purely technical or economic. Actions (or 
non-actions) by potential operators and the Government will be principal 
considerations as a manufacturer decides when and if a launch decision is 
made for a CTR program. [Ref.13:p.63] 
As far back as 1990, Norman Augustine, Chairman of the Tiltrotor Technology 
Subcommittee of the FAA Research, Engineering, & Development Advisory Committee, 
also believed the systems integration barrier was primarily associated with the need for 
commitment. In testimony before Congress, Augustine described the problem in a rather 
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Catch 22 fashion. He maintained that manufacturers were unlikely to commit to 
production: 
Without first having order commitments from aircraft operators. Aircraft 
operators in turn, are unwilling to commit to the purchase of a fairly 
revolutionary new aircraft without greater understanding of their 
operational economics and reliability, along with assurance that needed 
vertiport facilities will be available. Operators of facilities in turn, are 
unwilling to commit to reasonably costly new capabilities until it is clear 
that there are aircraft, and passengers who are prepared to use them. 
[Ref.l :p.166] 
It was for these very reasons that the two primary recommendations were made. 
First, in regards to the need for a partnership, a CTR system requires a coordinated, 
substantive, long-term commitment from numerous independent interests [Ref.13:p.88]. 
These independent interests, such as commercial carriers or vertiport operators, control 
varied degrees of the required resources and decision-making capability associated with 
the entire CTR system. 
Concerning the need for a demonstration program, Augustine argues that "first and 
foremost,' potential future buyers and operators of civil tiltrotors seek to be convinced that 
the technology and economics are viable before they will commit funds and place orders 
for aircraft representing such a departure from conventional practice." [Ref.l:p.166] 
G. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITORS 
Success in exploiting the world-wide market for CTR applications is critically 
dependent on the ability of manufacturers to make their product available before their 
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competitors. There are very few companies with the capability to compete in this race to 
production. 
1. The Americans 
Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters Division are currently the only 
companies with extensive, previous experience in the tiltrotor arena. To date, they have 
invested over $600 million in tiltrotor programs. Additionally, they have stated their intent 
to work together on any size CTR project. Strictly from a technical and manufacturing 
standpoint, they will be prepared to produce a 40 passenger CTR by the year 2007. 
[Ref.13:p. 71] 
2. The Europeans 
In 1987, a joint European effort was launched by five countries to compete in the 
development of a tiltrotor aircraft. This multi-national endeavor, designated the European 
Future Advanced Rotorcraft (EUROFAR), resulted in a $225 million plan to develop a 
prototype by 1997. Though this original plan was not approved, a Phase II EUROFAR 
team comprised of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, has been underway since 
1993. This team is believed to possess the requisite technical expertise. To be 
competitive, it is believed that the addition of government subsidies will be necessary. 
[Ref.13:p. 71-72] 
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3. The Japanese 
The Japanese are very interested in the tiltrotor, and at one point contracted with 
Ishida, a Texas based firm, to develop the TW-68, a "tiltwing" aircraft [Ref. I :p.158]. 
According to Congressman Weldon however, "Ishida folded up a few years ago." [Ref.3] 
4. The Russians 
The Russians have admitted an interest in tiltrotor technology and have conducted 
some development work. Beyond that, they have offered very little specifics. 
[Ref.l :p.158] It is believed that this has included "predesign work and wind tunnel 
testing." [Ref.13:p. 72] But due to financial constraints, their aerospace industry is 
undergoing significant restructuring. "A Russian tiltrotor would not be expected to appear 
until well into the next century, and then perhaps as a joint development." [Ref.13:p. 72] 
5. Other Arrangements 
Though this is not currently the case with the tiltrotor, there has been a recent trend 
toward U.S. aerospace companies establishing relationships with non-U.S. companies. 
Due to large investments in time and the early negative cash flows, this type arrangement 
has been exploited in order to develop and build new generation commercial aircraft. 
[Ref.13:p. 72-73] 
A number of competitive scenarios are possible, however it is safe to assume that 
the size of the tiltrotor market will limit the number of companies that elect to get 
involved. Furthermore, only major companies will launch CTR programs. [Ref.13:p. 72] 
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H. SUMMARY 
This chapter has identified the various applications in which the tiltrotor concept 
is believed to hold potential. Studies indicate the short-haul market appears to hold the 
greatest promise [Refs.13, 41 and 44]. The congestion and over-capacity problem within 
our national aviation system, and its relationship to short-haul transportation requirements 
was described. Additionally, how employment of the tiltrotor concept in the short-haul 
passenger market is believed to be the solution to this national problem, was explained. 
[Refs.13, 41, 43 and 44] Furthermore, a summary of four key tiltrotor market studies was 
summarized. Finally, the potential tiltrotor market competitors were identified and 
discussed. 
Successfu) introduction of the tiltrotor in the short-haul market has implications far 
beyond simple financial rewards for aircraft manufactures and operators. Employment of 
the tiltrotor concept as part of a new and innovative national transportation system has 
revolutionary implications. It infers significant societal benefits for the individual traveler, 
and the national as a whole. [Refs .1, 13, 41 and 44]. However, as presented here, 
significant risk and uncertainty remains [Ref.13]. 
Next, Chapter V will identify, analyze, and discuss any evidence of a dependence 
between Defense development of the MV -22, and potential future innovation of the CTR. 
Learning experience derived through MV -22 development, enabling technologies, as well 
as other benefits will also be addressed. 
86 
V. THE CIVILTILTROTOR'S DEPENDENCE ON THE MV-22 OSPREY 
The tiltrotor "concept" has been proven technically feasible through well over 4Q 
years of Defense development, and three generations of tiltrotor aircraft. The CTR has 
not. However, with each successive generation, the experience gained and lessons rearned 
from previous undertakings becomes the technology base upon which each new tiltrotor 
aircraft is developed. [Ref.28] 
This trend will likely continue with development of the CTR, both in terms of 
Government support, and its dependence on previous tiltrotor aircraft. As explained in the 
Phase I market study: "all designs make use of V-22 military technology." [Ref.41:p.22] 
This chapter will examine the extent to which the CTR is dependent on Defense 
development, procurement, and operational employment of the MV -22 Osprey. First, the 
role of the U.S. Government in past, present, and future tiltrotor initiatives will be 
discussed. Next, the MV -22 contributions made through operational experience and 
technology demonstration will be explored. This will be followed by an examination of 
the various CTR configurations designed and envisioned for commercial use. Finally, 
various CTR enabling technologies, technology transfers, and other benefits derived from 
development of the MV-22 will be identified and discussed. 
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A. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
Government development of the tiltrotor, dating back to the early 1950s, was 
intended primarily to benefit the Defense Department [Refs.13 and 27]. However, 
Government involvement in the CTR is not new. 
1. Providing the Leadership 
According to Georgia Tech's McKeithan, NASA has always had a standing offer 
"to help any U.S. manufacturer come up to speed on tiltrotor technology." [Ref.l :p.109] 
Furthermore, according to McKeithan, those involved in the XV -15 project as far 
back as the late 1970s considered tiltrotor technology to hold more promise in the civil 
sector than in the Defense Department [Ref.1 :p.109]. 
As the original JMVX program was launched and Government studies came to a 
close, resources were shifted toward the exploration of civil applications of tiltrotor 
technology. A majority of these efforts were led by Dr. John Zuk, the Chief of the Civil 
Technology Office at NASA Ames Research Center [Ref.1 :p.109]. Dr. Zuk later became 
the Study Director for that first, NASA sponsored, Phase I tiltrotor study [Ref.41]. As a 
_side note, Dr. Zuk was a major supporter of this thesis study, and now works out of 
NASA Ames' Tiltrotor Project Office. 
During the 1980s the FAA also studied the potential for civil application of the 
tiltrotor. Their focus was in exploring its potential for relieving the airport congestion 
problem, discussed in Chapter IV [Ref.1 :p.109]. Later, the FAA opened a Civil Tiltrotor 
Special Projects Office. The title was ultimately changed to the Vertical Flight Programs 
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Office, to consider issues involving other VTOL concepts, such as the helicopter. 
[Ref.1 :p.146] 
Finally, in 1992 Congress passed the Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise 
Improvement, and Intermodel Transportation Act of 1992. Section 135 of the act directed 
the Secretary of Transportation to establish a Civil Tiltrotor Development Advisory 
Committee, to study the potential use of the tiltrotor as part of a national transportation 
system. Its results were summarized in Chapter IV. [Ref.13] 
2. Sharing the Financial Burden 
In the past, the Defense Department, with NASA support, has funded the majority 
of tiltrotor research. [Refs.1 :p.109 and 13:p.17] For aircraft manufacturers to launch a 
CTR production program to support the national transportation system, they will be 
required to invest over a $1 billion. However, they will not do so until the technical and 
market risks are considered manageable. Risk reduction will require Government 
cooperation, leadership, and financial relief. Without the "partnership" discussed in 
Chapter IV, manufacturers would be unwilling to manufacture CTRs, with no guarantees 
that the rest of the CTR "system" will materialize. It would be unlikely, no matter how 
promising the market, that the CTR would happen "in the near future." [Ref.l3:p.93] 
However, Bell's Horner suggests another option for securing CTR cost-sharing. 
In Congressional testimony Horner suggested that Bell-Boeing might consider "the 
possibility of going into the international market and look for a source of funding." 
[Ref.1:p.127] This action might overcome a major obstacle for the manufacturers, 
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however it would do little in forming the coalition that is considered essential in solving 
the nation's short-haul transportation problem. [Refs.13, 41 and 44] 
Such action does not guarantee carrier orders, nor answer questions regarding 
infrastructure. Prospective CTR carriers would still require that questions concerning 
infrastructure be answered before they commit to buys. Additionally, operators would still 
be concerned with public acceptance, reliability, and operating costs. [Ref.13:p.94] Local 
authorities, including potential vertiport operators, would still need to see that adverse 
environmental issues (external noise in particular) can be mitigated through development. 
[Ref.13:p.94] As described in Chapter IV, this situation creates an uncertain, high risk, 
Catch 22 scenario. 
All entities involved in the national partnership stand to benefit from its future 
prospects. However, this "systems problem" involves too many technical and financial 
risks. No single entity can shoulder their individual financial responsibilities in isolation. 
[Ref.13:p.93] Leadership and financial resources therefore, are two of the key ingredients 
considered necessary in breaking the Catch 22 cycle. As a result, with the exception of 
the Eurostudy, a key recommendation of the previous research was for a Government led, 
cost-sharing partnership [Refs.l3, 41 and 44]. 
B. CTR DEPENDENCE ON MV -22 OPERATIONS 
If the tiltrotor follows the classic route, the civil tiltrotor application will 
wait until the military version has been proven. Therefore, in order for the 
United States to maintain the lead in tiltrotor technology, the Department 
of Defense must continue development of the military V -22. [Ref.1 :p.26] 
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This statement was made by Florida Representative Tom Lewis during 1990 
Congressional hearings on Civil Tiltrotor Applications Research. It is not unreasonable 
to assume that Congressman Lewis' testimony was, in reality, out of concern for the future 
of the MV-22, as opposed to the CTR. That assumption would be valid, based on the 
military program's unstable history throughout the late 1980s, and the coalition that was 
built during that period to keep it alive. Numerous stakeholders provided Congressional 
testimonial pressing for continuance of the MV-22 program [Refs.1 and 37]. As a result, 
much of the validity concerning the need for the MY -22 to serve as a CTR prerequisite 
may have been negated. 
1. Military Operational Experience 
Still, as discussed in Chapter II, the belief that the military must serve as the 
proving grounds for new aviation concepts is not new, and is a view held by many. 
[Refs.1, 2, 5, 12, 13, 19, 44 and 45] For example, the Phase II study states that "military 
production aircraft may contribute to proving the tiltrotor concept by demonstrated 
success." [Ref.44:p.4] Likewise, the Eurostudy advises that "civil acceptance awaits 
operational experience from military tiltrotor aircraft; i.e., safety, reliability, and 
environmental suitability." [Ref.45:p.5] Other sources provide more tangible justification 
for the reasons why military experience is needed. The CTRDAC in its Report to 
Congress states that: 
As the military gains experience flying the V-22 over thousands of hours, 
this will add to the general knowledge of tiltrotors and will be helpful to 
designers of the CTR. .. there would be enough similarities in certain critical 
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components that extensive V -22 operational experience would provide some 
helpful information to civil designers in terms of failure modes. While the 
V-22 and the CTR would be used for different missions, the basic 
aeromechanics and flight characteristics are common and would benefit 
CTR design activity. [Ref.13:p.20] 
Morris Flater, former President of Hubexpress Airlines, and current President of 
the American Helicopter Society and CTRDAC member, was even more specific. In 
testimony before Congress, Flater, then speaking from the perspective of an operator, 
explained why he thought the potential experience gained through flying the MV -22 was 
necessary. He explained that [he]: 
Would like to see the V -22 Osprey adopted as a military program, so that 
when it becomes available commercially, the engines, rotors, transmissions, 
and major components will have the 6,000 hours TBOs (time between 
overhauls) we need in commercial aviation to make the aircraft cost 
effective. Only with extensive military experience will the FAA extend 
component overhaul and maintenance intervals into ranges we require. 
[Ref. I :p.42] 
The CTRDAC supports this idea as well. It states that: 
By flying these relatively large tiltrotor transports for some years, the 
military will provide the necessary experience to judge whether an aircraft 
such as the V-22 tiltrotor has the potential for profitable applications in the 
civilian sector. [Ref.B:p.A-3] 
NASA's Rosen may have addressed the need for operational experience better than 
anyone. In a prepared statement presented to Congress, Rosen clarified the critical 
difference between what is gained from an operational aircraft, as opposed to strictly a 
technology demonstration aircraft. He wrote: 
Successful experimental aircraft programs, such as the XV -15, can provide 
validation of new vehicle concepts, but a great deal of risk remains for 
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product development. There is very little operational or manufacturing 
experience in an "X" aircraft on which to base an economic decision for a 
commercial aircraft...The first-generation vehicle is often a military 
vehicle. That military vehicle provides a data base of operational 
experience that helps reduce the uncertainties for potential civil users and 
regulators ... A basis for civil certification is provided. Civil tiltrotors may 
fall into this category and could be accelerated by successful development 
and operation of a military aircraft. [Ref.1 :p.140] 
The operational experience that the CTR would gain from Defense procurement 
and fielding of the Osprey is substantial. According to The CTRDAC, the MV -22 fleet 
will have accumulated approximately 60,000 flight hours by 2005, still two years prior to 
anticipated CTR production Ref.13:pps.20 and 71]. 
2. Technology Demonstration 
As of yet, no representative CTR prototype exists. Still, the four CTR market 
studies, agency representatives, and individual experts, all recommend that the CTR be 
presented to stakeholders through a technology demonstration program. Until a CTR 
demonstrator is in fact prototyped, the studies suggest an interim solution. [Refs.1, 13, 41, 
44 and 45] 
The Phase II study recommends that NASA sponsor the interim program "using V-
22, upgraded XV-15, and flight simulator assets." [Ref.44:p.vi] It further suggests using 
two MV-22s for a "30-day North American demonstration tour," package express trial, 
and both enroute and terminal ATC operations. [Ref.44] 
The CTRDAC discussed the merits of using the XV -15 as opposed to the MV -22, 
but rejected that idea because "the V -22 is very close in size to a 40 passenger CTR," and 
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"believed that local communities would rather see a vehicle the same size and weight as 
a potential CTR." [Ref.13:p. 90] Furthermore, the CTRDAC believed that V -22 
demonstration "would be absolutely essential to gain knowledge related to community 
acceptance, particularly in the areas of noise and safety." [Ref.13:p.91-92] 
As opposed to a "straight V-22," the CTRDAC recommended a two-phase 
approach using a modified Osprey. "Phase A" would primarily consist of ground and 
wind tunnel testing, and limited flight testing to evaluate both necessary and desired, 
commercially unique features. [Ref.13:p.89-90] These commercial advances will be 
discussed later, at length. 
Phase B would involve actual demonstration of a modified MV-22 equipped with 
these integrated civil features. Development and assembly would occur from 1998 through 
2001, while the actual demonstration would be conducted between 2001 and 2003. 
[Ref.13:p.90] 
The CTRDAC maintains that the required commercial advances eluded to cannot 
be addressed through MV-22 operations. [Ref.13:p.A-5] To some extent, the researcher 
agrees. However, some advances ~being mitigated to varying degrees; not through 
operations, but through development of the MV -22. Additionally, there are others. Those 
that are relevant will be addressed in further detail. 
One might ask: What if the military MV -22 program were canceled prior to a 
production decision? What tiltrotor would then be used to fill the interim demonstrator 
requirement? In Congressional testimony Bell's Horner explained that the original plan 
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involved working with DOD, and actually pulling two production MV-22s off the 
production line. He went on to explain that if the program were killed prior to reaching 
a production decision, that they (Bell-Boeing) would still use the pre-production MV-22 
prototypes [Ref.l :p.129-130]. 
In regards to a demonstration program's effect on the lack of supporting 
infrastructure, the CTRDAC acknowledges that "a full network of large, sophisticated 
vertiports will not spring into existence all at once." [Ref.13:p.49] However, it is expected 
that a CTR demonstration program will aid infrastructure development, by enabling the 
establishment of a "start-up network" of vertiports. This will minimize initial vertiport 
investment, while demonstrating how such a CTR system can successfully function. 
[Ref.13:p.49] 
Both the Phase II study and the CTRDAC recommended that following the interim 
MV-22 solution, that the demonstration program should continue with "Phase C," and the 
use of a CTR2000 prototype. This phase would span the years 2003 to 2008 [Ref.13 and 
44]. 
C. THE CIVILTILTROTOR (CTR) 
One could suggest: Why not just use a slightly modified MV -22, or a "stretched 
V -22" for commercial passenger service? To a very limited extent, excluding some 
commercial certification considerations, this is not totally impossible. It is more a question 
of what is marketable and economically practical. 
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1. The MV -22; Built to Military Specifications 
As pointed out by General Magnus, "the V-22 was build to military specifications." 
[Ref.l2] These specifications emphasize "improved performance and combat 
survivability." [Ref.41 :p.l5] As a result, in meeting these specifications, the design 
"appreciably increases fuel burn, adds structural weight, and adds complexity." 
[Ref.44::p.l8] 
The MV-22 was designed to meet the mission requirements of the Services. 
Requirements for damage tolerance features, infrared suppression, rear loading capability, 
folding rotor systems, and other "mission equipment," add substantially to manufacturing 
costs. [Ref.44:p.l8] 
The type materials and manufacturing methods take into account the rigors of 
aggressive flight regimes, and harsh operating environments. The consideration given to 
the corrosive shipboard environment during the design and manufacturing of durable, 
corrosive-resistant composite materials, is an example. [Ref.44:p.l8] Ballistic tolerant 
fuel cells are another. 
Defense contracts require manufacturers to comply with the constraints imposed 
in meeting "milspecs." These contracts and the Government acquisition process require 
lengthy, complicated, and costly processes to handle paperwork, accounting, inspections, 
and documentation. [Ref.44:p.18] 
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CTR technology is not at the point where an economically viable, 40 passenger, 
commercial derivative can be built. In testimony before Congress, Boeing's Renouard 
explained that: 
Although the V -22 is a key step on the road to widespread use of civil 
tiltrotors .. .it is not possible to merely repaint or tweak the military version 
in order to produce a commercially viable tiltrotor alternative. [Ref.l :p. 70] 
In order to reduce both the technical and financial risks, and for commercial 
certification of a CTR to take place, there must be further commercial advances in, among 
other things: 
*Composites. 
*Manufacturing processes. 
* Flight controls. 
* External noise reduction. 
* Internal noise reduction/Vibration. 
* Contingency power. 
[Refs.13, 41 and 44] 
2. Initial CTR Designs 
One of the priorities of the Phase I CTR study was to identify practical CTR 
configurations which could best support the particular markets under assessment. II A V-
22-based commercial tiltrotor can realize significant savings in weight and cost by 
eliminating military mission and survivability features. II [Ref.44:p.27] 
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Changes for commercial operation can be divided into two categories. The first 
are those changes that are absolutely essential in order to gain FAA certification. The 
second category include changes that are considered desirable from a cost savings 
perspective, or one that adds passenger comfort or accommodations. [Ref.44:P:27] 
Increased power output to accommodate one engine inoperative (OEI) 
requirements, is an example of changes necessary for certification. Redesign of the fuel 
system is not necessary, but highly desirable, and is an example of the second category. 
[Ref.44:p.27] 
Seven configurations were considered, capable of carrying between eight and 75 
passengers. All were required to satisfy a short-haul range requirement of 600 nm. Of 
the seven confi_gurations, three were "all new" designs, while four were MV-22 
derivatives. [Ref.41] A summary of those initial designs, developed for the Phase I study, 
is as follows: 
a. All New Designs 
* The CTR-800, designed to carry 8 passengers, is the approximate size of 
the XV -15. Its size was seen as best supporting executive transport. 
* The CTR-1900 carries 19, and is similar in appearance to some of the 
smallest commuter turboprops currently in use. 
* The CTR-7500 is the largest configuration studied, capable of carrying 75 
passengers, 5 abreast. 
b. MV-22 Derivatives 
* The CTR-22A, essentially an unmodified MV -22, was rejected because of 
the limitations imposed by its transmission and fuel range. Without 
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upgrade, the aircraft was incapable of meeting a major civil certification 
milestone eluded to earlier. This requirement calls for the ability to hover 
with one engine inoperative (OEI), and safely transition to takeoff. An 
addition desire was the ability to complete this evolution, and the 600 nms 
short-haul outer envelope. In order to accomplish this, additiona) 
consideration would have to be given to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) fuel 
reserves. 
* The CTR-22B, capable of transporting 31 passengers, is considered the 
"minimum change V-22". [Ref.41:p.19] It includes an upgraded 
transmission, and the basic amenities of small commercial aircraft 
(lavatory, galley, and baggage). 
* The CTR-22C uses the MV -22 wing and propulsion system, but a unique 
fuselage. Without engine growth, it is capable of transporting 39 
passengers, 3 abreast. 
* The CTR-220 widens the CTR-22C's fuselage to accommodate four 
abreast, and a total capacity of 52 passengers. To satisfy the 600 nm range 
requirement necessitates engine growth of approximately 15%. [Ref.41] 
"The design technology of the V -22 military tiltrotor drove the preliminary design 
of all the configurations." [Ref.41:p.ll] Furthermore, "the structural design concept and 
propulsion systems used on all the configurations are the same as the V -22 military 
tiltrotor." [Ref.41:p.ll] 
Still, the Phase I study acknowledges that these configurations were developed 
primarily to facilitate the market research, and were not necessarily considered for actual 
development. "V -22 derivatives offer some market penetration, but new designs are 
required to meet full potential market." [Ref.41 :p.12] The CTRDAC went even further 
in this regard. It was the committee's belief that "there is a general consensus that the 
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unique military capabilities built into the V -22 make it an unlikely candidate for a CTR, 
even in a modified form." [Ref.13:p.20] 
3. The CTR2000 
"Military V -22 production cost experience has little direct comparability to 
manufacture of commercial tiltrotors". [Ref.44:p.18] "Commercial developments ... tend 
to emphasize lower production costs, improved vehicle operational efficiencies, and 
increased aircraft availability with lower maintenance costs." [Ref.41 :p.15] 
Taking such considerations into account, "an entirely new CTR design will be 
necessary for the civil market." [Ref.13:p.23] These factors led manufacturers to work 
with NASA in their efforts to establish a "baseline design" for the CTR aircraft. This 
design incorporated what was believed to be the best available and ongoing technologies 
in 1994. [Ref.13:p.A-2] 
Manufacturers went on to design a configuration that the CTRDAC utilized in their 
analysis and report to Congress [Ref.13:p.23]. The CTR2000 accommodates commercial 
manufacturing and operating realities. At the same time, it optimizes its seating capacity 
-to target the short-haul passenger market. [Ref.13:p.23-24 and A-2]] The aircraft features 
room for 40 passengers, has a maximum gross vertical takeoff weight of 43,150 lbs, and 
can cruise at 315 knots [Ref.13:p.24]. 
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D. CTR DEPENDENCE ON MV-22 DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
"Inevitably, tiltrotor development knowledge will benefit from the experience 
gained from ... the two phases of V-22 development, the Full-Scale Development (FSD) 
and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)." [Ref.13:p.A-1] In fact, as 
pointed out by Roger Lacy and Joseph Wilkerson of Boeing's Helicopter Division, "as the 
V -22 development has progressed through Full Scale Development (FSD) and Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phases, promise of.a viable CTR continue to 
grow." [Ref.46:p.2] Furthermore, "the V -22 will provide the basic, or core, tiltrotor 
technologies, including handling qualities, performance, dynamics, and stability." 
[Ref.13:p.A-3] 
As opposed to a highly modified MV -22, it has previously been established that the 
CTR will likely be an "all new" design [Ref.13:p.23]. In order to accommodate passenger 
travel and amenities, commercial efficiencies, and FAA certification, key technologies 
must be adopted to the uniqueness of commercial operations. [Ref.13:p.A-3] 
In regards to technology transfer between the MV -22 and the CTR, Colonel Bob 
Garner, MV-22 Program Manager raised some cautions. In an interview with the 
researcher, he explained that: 
You have to be careful with the way you talk about these things. In one's 
mind, one needs to be able to separate the technology from the hardware. 
The technology is directly transferable. The hardware is probably not. 
[Ref.47] 
NASA's Dr. Zuk adds, "yes, the V-22 has a lot of direct spinoffs." [Ref.48] 
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The CTRDAC claims that MV-22 operations cannot address these unique 
commercial advances. [Ref.13:p.A-5]. Still, a great deal can be learned in regards to 
these commercial design requirements by assessing where one is in terms of th.e 
development of related MV-22 technologies. MV-22 systems can provide baselines, and 
highlight the direction in which those technologies must be taken to derive commercial 
variations. Some baseline technologies can aid in the consideration of commercial 
certification requirements, operator and community acceptance, passenger comfort, and 
competitive economics. [Ref.13:p.A-3] 
1. "Fiber Placement" Composite Manufacturing 
The most significant of the advanced technologies incorporated in the MV -22 is the 
extensive use of composites. "To date, no commercial aircraft has used more advanced 
composites than the V-22." [Ref.41:p.44] More significant, is its associated innovative 
composites manufacturing process called "fiber placement." [Ref.49] CTR manufacturers 
are certain to exploit this advance, should a final management decision select composite 
technology over aluminum. [Ref.13] 
Increases in the use of composite materials in aircraft programs, and its associated 
high cost manufacturing processes, have led to the development of improved automatic 
manufacturing methods. The two most prevalent automated methods are filament winding 
and automated tape lay-up. However, both processes have limitations in their flexibility 
to work with certain aspects of contouring. [Ref.49:p.69] 
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Filament winding is best when dealing with circular cross sections or convexed 
surfaces. A continuous process, it is difficult to maintain ply thickness if the structure's 
contour changes. Subsequent machining to obtain the required thickness often becomes 
necessary. [Ref.49:p.69] 
Automated tape lay-up works well with relatively simple contours. An automated 
tape-laying machine (A TLM) dispenses pre impregnated tape directly to the tool surface. 
However, it must conform to natural fiber paths. Any deviation will result in wrinkling 
of the tape. [Ref.49:p.69] 
Boeing Helicopter's Lee Kitson and Brice Johnson, in a paper presented before the 
1995 American Helicopter Society's annual forum, presented a new process for 
manufacturing composites called "fiber placement." They describe the process as "an 
innovative new technology which blends the best features of filament winding and 
automated tape lay-up." [Ref.49:p. 70] 
Fiber placement enables versatility in handling a wide variety of structure sizes and 
configurations. It combines speed, accuracy and repeatability; qualities not combined in 
either of the other two methods, yet expected in cost-effective, automated processes. 
[Ref.49:p. 70] 
"A fiber placement machine combines multiple pre impregnated fiber tows into a 
wide band for direct application to a tool surface at near zero tension." [Ref.49:p. 70] 
Similar to filament winding, "material is deposited on to a rotating mandrel and the 
individual tows have the ability to pay out at different rates." [Ref.49:p. 70] This allows 
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for changes in structural size and contour. Like automated tape lay-up, the roller remains 
in contact with the structure's surface. 
The fiber placement process was first demonstrated by the Air Force Materials Lab, 
when Hercules Aerospace applied the process to three MV-22 aft fuselage sections for 
Boeing Helicopters. With its success, Boeing first realized the potential for applying this 
emerging process to other production activities. [Ref.49:p. 70] 
According to the CTRDAC, the primary issues in regards to a composite CTR, are 
"extended fatigue life and failure modes." [Ref.13:p.A-10] Before Government 
certification of a composite CTR will occur, "this concern must be dealt with 
accordingly." [Ref.13:p.A-10] 
2. Manufacturing 
"The V -22 is the first major aircraft to be entirely computer designed." 
[Ref.2:p.54] Hand-in-hand with the leading edge work in the composites area, enormous 
strides are now being made in the Osprey program's application of digital technology to 
the design and manufacturing process. These technologies are commonly referred to as 
computer-aided design (CAD), and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM). [Ref.13:p.A-
11] 
Computer-Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA),is being 
linked directly into aspects of manufacturing from design and development of tooling, to 
fabrication of components and structural elements. The entire structural development is 
controlled by a "digital sole authority data set." [Ref.13:p.A-11] A wealth of CTR 
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transferable knowledge "will be gained by examining how the MV -22 production 
experience progresses." [Ref.B:p.A-12] 
3. Flight Control System 
According to the Phase II study, "significant redesign of the V -22 redundant digital 
fly-by-wire flight control system is not anticipated." To a degree, this is possible because 
the Interim Airworthiness Criteria (lAC) does not address fly-by-wire systems in great 
depth. [Ref.44:p.28] Although serving as a technology base in this regard, the MV -22 
system operates without a mechanical backup, and FAA certification has generally 
required this "rudimentary mechanical" capability [Ref.13:p.A-5]. It is likely therefore, 
that the CTR will require same increased reliability through the addition of rudimentary 
redundancy. [Ref.13:p.A-6] 
4. External Noise Reduction 
"V-22 data are needed to validate noise profiles for larger commercial tiltrotors." 
[Ref.44:p.35] In this regard, it may be more a matter of learning what llQl to transfer 
from the MV -22 to the CTR. 
A great deal of tiltrotor noise generation is attributable to what is referred to as 
Blade Vortex Interaction (BVI). BVI is greatest during approach to landing, and is 
considerable in the MV -22 three-bladed rotor design. [Ref.13;p.A-14] As a result, the 
MY-22's noise profile "is on the borderline of meeting FAA/International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) requirements" when in the landing approach phase. [Ref.B:p.A-12] 
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Research and development of noise reduction technology is being headed by 
NASA. It includes the development of a four or five-bladed rotor system, as opposed to 
the three-bladed system used on the MV-22. [Ref.13:C-7] However, the CTRDAC points 
out that regardless of the redesign, a low noise rotor will not, in and of itself, be enough 
to satisfy the external noise goal of 12 dBA. [Ref.13:p.A-14] 
The CTRDAC voiced critical concerns in regards to progress being made in noise 
reduction technology, "other than rotors." The committee felt that the level of funding 
precluded timely solutions that would support the results desired by the year 2005. 
[Ref.13:p.C-7] 
Add to this, the fact that Title 49 USC, section 44715, now prohibits the FAA from 
issuing an original type certification if it finds "that the manufacturer has not incorporated 
all technically practicable and economically reasonable noise abatement technologies 
appropriate for the aircraft design." [Ref.13:p.C-8] 
However, even if a CTR is technically within compliance, the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) point out, that this: 
Is not to be construed as a Federal determination that the aircraft is 
acceptable from a noise standpoint in particular airport environments. 
Responsibility for determining the permissible noise levels of aircraft using 
an airport remains with the proprietor of the airport and surrounding 
community. [Ref.50:Part 36:p.1] 
Couple these facts with the high probability that CTR operations will involve highly 
populated, city-center areas. The end result is that noise reduction becomes a critical CTR 
design consideration. [Ref.13:p.A-12 - A-13] 
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However, in addition to noise reduction technology, there are also operational 
techniques that can be used to abate noise in the vicinity of vertiports. [Ref.44:p.35] The 
CTRDAC refers to these techniques as "flight path management." [Ref.13:p.A-14] 
Landing approach glidepath angle selection is an example. Because of its VTOL 
capability, a CTR can approach a vertiport at much steeper angles of decent, than can a 
turboprop. For fixed-wing aircraft, the standard glidepath is three degrees. Preliminary 
tests indicate the optimal CTR glidepath is somewhere in the vicinity of 9 to 12 degrees 
[Ref.44:p.42]. During flight simulation evaluations, Government and Industry test pilots 
actually preferred the 12 to 15 degree range. [Ref. 44:p.42] 
This can have a significant impact in decreasing external noise levels through 
standard arrival procedures. As described in the CTRDAC's report, at one mile from 
touchdown, using a three degree glideslope, an aircraft is approximately 270 feet above 
ground level (AGL). Using a 9 degree glideslope on the other hand, increases that height 
to 800 AGL. [Ref.13:p.19] 
The FAA is heavily involved in this area. In a telephonic interview with the 
FAA's Steve Fisher, he described how preparations are underway to standardize and 
certify CTR vertical flight terminal area procedures (VERTAPS). He was cautiously 
optimistic that some of this approach certification may eventually involve the MV -22. 
[Ref. 51] 
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Both noise reduction technology and flight path management techniques will be 
integrated and tested aboard a modified MV-22, during Phase B of the technology 
demonstration program. [Ref.13:p.A-23 - A-25] 
5. Internal Noise Reduction/Vibration Levels 
MV-22 development can provide relatively little technology transfer in these areas 
of concern. Very minor considerations were given to internal noise levels and passenger 
comfort since the aircraft was designed as a military transport. [Ref.13:p.A-15] 
However, the Osprey does provide a beneficial starting point or baseline from 
which to engineer design improvements in the CTR. For example, the interior noise 
levels of most short-haul commuters is in the 75 to 85 DBA range. The Phase II study 
reveals that the "minimum change" CTR-22B can reduce noise levels to approximately 85 
dBAs using approximately 500 lbs of active suppression devices, and passive insulation. 
It further explains that an additional 220 lbs would further reduce that level to 78 DBAS. 
[Ref.41:p.34] 
Significant reductions in vibratory loads can be realized as a by-product of reducing 
external noise levels. By adding additional rotor blades, improvements are 
achieved in both areas. 
6. Contingency Power Requirements 
FAA regulations require that an aircraft possess the capability to either fly away, 
or hover and land, following a single engine failure. There are several options for 
providing an aircraft with this capability. [Ref.13:p.25] 
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First, one way to achieve this capability is to design-in excess shaft horsepower 
(SHP) in the engines. This is not considered cost effective, considering the added weight, 
fuel consumption, and operating costs, as compared to the high reliability levels and 
probability of engine failure. [Ref.13:p.25] 
More likely, is to take advantage of the fact that turbine engines can be operated 
beyond their normal limits for short periods of time. Long term, this alternative can have 
cost impacts. However, they are considered more reasonable. This is so because the 
effects of operations above the normal range are cumulative, and reduce the engine's 
remaining service life. However, it is likely to be more cost effective to remove and 
replace an engine ahead of schedule, than to operate the aircraft at higher costs on a 
routine basis by_ carrying excess horsepower. [Ref.13:p.25] 
The MV -22, like most military aircraft, has contingency power capability that takes 
advantage of this second option. The MV-22 however, must add additional OEI 
considerations unique to the rotor synchronization requirements of tiltrotors and tandem 
rotor helicopters. The CTRDAC recommends that "any prospective CTR should use an 
OEI contingency design similar to the X-15 an V-22." [Ref.13:p.A-7] "However, because 
the V -22 is a military aircraft, it is not required to meet the stringent FAA certification 
rules for commercial use." [Ref.13:p.A-6] 
E. ECONOMIC BENEFITS DERIVED FROM PRODUCTION OF THE MV -22 
Production of the MV-22 is scheduled to begin in 1997. Assuming a timely 
decision is reached, and production takes place as scheduled, a number of substantial 
109 
impacts should be felt. Some benefits are derived as a direct result of MV -22 production. 
Others are indirect, and based on an assumption that production of CTR derivatives are 
dependent on a predecessor military version for reasons previously described. A study 
done by the Department of Commerce, taking into account multiplier effects, concluded 
that the total increase in national economic activity as a result of CTR production could 
be as high as $80 billion per 1,000 CTRs produced. [Ref.44:p.3] These benefits include 
such considerations as the balance of trade, the aircraft industrial base, and jobs. 
[Ref.2:p.47-48]. 
1. Balance of Trade 
Assuming that U.S. manufacturers maintain their seven to ten year lead over world 
competitors, initial CTRs will likely be produced in this country. Georgia Tech's 
McKeithan believed this could lead to "an entirely new segment of the aviation industry, 
dominated by the United States." [Ref. I :p.123] 
During 1990 House testimony, Bell's Horner, using the Phase I study as his source, 
estimated total CTR exports could easily top $10 billion [Ref.1:p.12]. The Phase II study 
estimated CTR exports could generate $28 billion in the first ten years of production 
[Ref.44:p.3]. Based on 1994 dollars and a 20 year CTR production period, the CTRDAC 
puts that figure more conservatively at approximately $17.8 billion [Ref.13:p.E-86]. 
2. Aircraft Industrial Base 
Clearly, the major recipients of the financial benefits of any program are 
the prime tier contractors ... Companies that compose the middle tier of V-
22 contractors also will benefit financially from the program ... The largest 
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group of companies supporting the program is the lower tier, composed of 
subcontractors who supply the first two tiers with parts, materials, 
semifinished goods, and specialized services. This tier of suppliers consists 
of the most vulnerable and critical group of suppliers to the U.S. industrial 
base. [Ref.2:p.52-53] 
It is estimated that perhaps as much as 1,000 companies will eventually be involved 
in the development and production of the MV -22. These companies will benefit directly 
from MV -22 production by supplying systems, components, materials, and services. 
[Ref.2:p.48] 
Perhaps more significant, will be the indirect impact that MV -22 production has 
in contributing to the economic health of those companies who have a stake in production 
of the CTR. This is so, because many of the same companies involved in MV -22 
production, will likely be involved in the production of civil derivatives. [Ref.2:p.49] In 
addition, there will likely be new entrants into the market, hoping to exploit a percentage 
of the increase in demand [Ref.2:p.63]. Developing the MV-22 will lead in turn to the 
development and production of new technologies and materials applicable to the CTR, 
further stabilizing employment, and enhancing skills in the civil aircraft industry. 
-[Ref.2:p.54] 
3. Employment 
A third positive benefit of MV -22 production will be felt by the labor force. 
Development and production of the Osprey, will create a demand for workers with new 
skills, some unique to the tiltrotor technology. According to a CTR Industrial Base Impact 
study, depending on market demand, CTR sales could indirectly generate an additional 
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100,000 to 300,000 jobs over the course of the CTRis production period. [Ref.2:p.62] 
The CTRDAC report points out that nearly all large turboprop aircraft that support the 
short-haul commercial market are manufactured in foreign countries. The report estimates 
that capturing the lower bound world market of 1,160 required CTRs, could indirectly 
generate and maintain a demand for an estimated 648,000 jobs during the 2007 to 2021 
production period. [Ref.13;p. 79] 
In an interview with Congressman Pete Geren, in easily understandable qualitative 
terms, the Congressman may have summed up best, what CTR spinoffs of the V-22 can 
equate to in overall economic terms. The Congressman argued that the "the V-22 has the 
potential to do for many parts of the country, what Boeing did for Seattle." [Ref.19] 
F. QUANTIFYING THE CTR's DEPENDENCE ON THE MV-22 
Finally, the question must be asked: Could the CTR still happen without Defense 
procurement of the MV-22? In 1990 Congressional testimony, when again, it appeared 
that the MV -22 program would not survive, Bell Is Horner was asked that question. 
Specifically, he was asked whether cancellation of the MV -22 would "kill the CTR or 
postpone it? Horner, speaking on behalf of both Bell and Boeing, began his response by 
stating that such a predicament had already been studied. It was the manufacturers' belief 
that the CTR could still possibly happen, but that "you I d be looking at, at least a eight to 
ten year delay and probably longer." [Ref.1 :p.l28] Horner went on to describe how "it 
was very questionable as to whether or not the investment would still be 
worthwhile ... without that stamp of approval." [Ref.1 :p.127] The stamp of approval 
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Horner was referring to, seems to capture the essence of what the CTR derives from the 
operational experience the MY -22 can potentially provide. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has identified and analyzed the key dependencies that exist between 
the MV -22, and potential CTR derivatives. Some dependencies, such as the use of the 
MV-22 as a technology demonstrator provide a clear and more tangible example. Other 
dependencies such as those resulting in commercial variations of specific tiltrotor 
technologies may be somewhat more subtle. 
Still, regardless of the seemingly insignificance of any one or several dependencies, 
it is questionable as Bell's Horner pointed out, as to whether the CTR could happen 
without their collective influence. [Ref.l :p.128] 
The final chapter will draw conclusions, addressing the primary and subsidiary 
research questions. 
113 
114 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the research effort and provides conclusions by answering 
both the primary and subsidiary research questions. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Are potential CTR applications dependent on Defense development and 
procurement of the MV -22 Osprey, and if so, to what extent? 
The answer to this question is clearly yes. In regards to what extent, Dr. Zuk of 
NASA Ames phrased it best. Zuk argued that the MV -22 "is necessary, but not sufficient." 
[Ref48] A detailed discussion of the contributing factors to this dependence was provided 
in Chapter V. 
Agreement is nearly unanimous that this dependence is related to two key 
contributions provided by the MV -22. The first contribution will be gained through 
technology demonstration and operational experience, once the Osprey is fielded. [Refs.1, 13, 
19, 41, 43, 44 and 45]. The second contribution is based on the general tiltrotor knowledge, 
and technology transfer that is gained from the R&D, design, manufacturing, and production 
ofthe Osprey [Refs.1, 13, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47 and 48]. 
The American aviation industry currently maintains a slight lead over world 
competitors in the race to field a civil tiltrotor. [Ref.13] Continued progress towards fielding 
a CTR first, depends on gaining operational experience and data from a military derivative. 
Through its demonstrated reliability, safety and enhanced capabilities over other 
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transportation modes, the MV-22 can build confidence in the potential oftiltrotor technology. 
More specifically, it becomes the catalyst for gaining more widespread civil acceptance by 
potential investors, operators and the traveling public. [Refs.1, 13, 19, 43 and 45] 
Colonel Gamer believes tiltrotor technology has progressed sufficiently, to the point 
that manufacturers could build the CTR right now [Ref 4 7]. Congressman Weldon agrees. 
However, he feels it is questionable as to whether potential operators can be enticed to 
purchase it without demonstrated operational experience [Ref.3]. 
During the course of this investigation, a more serious issue concerning introduction 
of a CTR was uncovered. The reader will recall that in proving the tiltrotor's potential worth, 
the interim use of a V -22 derivative, as part of a technology demonstration program, is 
thought to be essential. This is particularly relevant to the short-haul commercial passenger 
market. [Refs.1, 13, 41, 44 and 45] Here, as NASA's Rosen described it, a "systems or 
systems integration problem" exists. [Ref. I] Or as the researcher described it, a Catch 22 
dilemma. Here, independent entities have exclusive control over various resources and 
decisions: Each consideration effects the entire tiltrotor "system," particularly the 
implementation of a supporting infrastructure. [Ref. I] 
A complex coalition of these interests must be formed. These interests must be 
convinced or enticed, to commit their resources and decision-making capability, if the tiltrotor 
system is ever going to come to fruition. The Government is being urged to provide the 
necessary leadership and financial assistance. This is to be done concurrently with what the 
MV -22 Osprey provides. Only then, can the systems integration problem be overcome. 
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[Refs.1, 13, 41 and 44] Most important, in trying to bring the CTR to market, overcoming 
the systems integration problem, and establishment of the supporting infrastructure are more 
critical than the MV-22 [Refs. 1, 13, 41 and 44]. 
The lack of available infrastructure brings to mind a useful analogy. In order to grasp 
the complexity of this problem, one should consider the following scenario: 
How easy would it have been 90 years ago, for aircraft manufacturers to convince 
potential investors to obligate their resources to purchase a fleet of revolutionary new 
aircraft? Now, consider that this same aircraft would require the support of hard-surface, 
10,000 foot runways. It is doubtful that those investors could have been persuaded to invest. 
B. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Seven subsidiary research questions were initially defined. Answers to each of those 
questions are as follows: 
1. Is there an historic commercial aviation dependence on Defense aviation 
research and development efforts? 
As noted in Chapter II, the Department of Defense has served as contributor and 
precursor to a great deal of the evolution that has taken place in the civil aviation arena. 
Revolutionary aviation developments, such as the jet aircraft and helicopter, first came to 
fruition in military aircraft designs. Advances such as these have ultimately evolved and been 
exploited through commercial and/or civil operational use. [RefS] 
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The most pronounced technological leaps in civil aviation have been dependent upon 
initial progress being made in development of military derivatives of those technologies. Most 
major advances in aviation have had a military technological precursor. [Ref 1] 
2. What are the historical barriers to commercial aviation innovation, and to 
what extent have these barriers been influenced by past Defense aviation development 
efforts? 
It is not the aircraft manufacturers who have exploited aircraft technologies, but rather 
operators and commercial carriers. [Refs. I and 6] Furthermore, without the potential for prof-
it, the commercial exploitation and application of innovative aviation technologies would be 
unlikely to occur. [Ref 5] 
As presented in Chapter II, there are three general barriers to the commercial 
innovation of new aviation technologies. They are the public's willingness to accept the new 
technologies, and the willingness of manufacturers and operators to assume the technical and 
financial risks associated with development and fielding. [Refs. I, 2, 5 and 9] There are two 
additional barriers that, in the past, pertained to utilization of the helicopter in the short-haul 
transportation market. They were the lack of a supporting infrastructure, and a consensus 
building coalition. [Refs.2 and 20] 
These barriers have been influenced to a great extent by two major contributions made 
by the Defense Department. One conscious or direct contribution has been the Defense 
Department's leadership in research and development. It is primarily associated with the 
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willingness ofthe Defense Department to pay a major percentage of the development costs, 
in proving new aviation concepts technically feasible. 
Inadvertently or indirectly, the Defense Department has had some effect on these 
barriers by providing operational experience in a military derivative of a particular aviation 
technology. [Refs.2 and 5] 
Aviation research and development has been comprised of just as many designs that 
were never fully developed, or ended in failed attempts, as opposed to successful innovations. 
Aircraft manufacturers and potential operators are all keenly aware of this. As a result, private 
investors have shown a general unwillingness to take the lead in innovative aviation 
technological development. Most research and development efforts associated with radical 
leaps in aviation technology have been lead and funded by Government efforts. [Ref 17] 
The Defense Department has funded numerous demonstration programs for the long 
term study of high risk technologies, prior to making a commitment to manufacture aircraft 
employing such technologies. Following through with production of military variants of an 
aviation concept also provides the demonstration through operational use. Demonstration 
is often a key factor in gaining the confidence and commitment from potential operators. 
[Refs.1, 13, 41 and 44] 
Finally, gaining operational experience is ultimately necessary to prove a technology's 
commercial potential. This provides the operator with valuable usage data, as well as tends 
to mitigate the risk potential to the traveling customer. [Ref 1] 
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3. Is there market potential for CTR applications, and if so, in what areas do 
these markets lie? 
According to a series of market studies conducted over the last ten years a11d 
summarized in Chapter IV, there is a world wide market for approximately 1160 - 1600 
CTRs. In the following categories there is a market for approximately 75 - 150. [Ref.l3] 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Corporate/Executive Travel- Most Fortune 500 companies operate a number of 
aircraft for their top executives and leading customers. 
Civil/Public Applications - This umbrella category includes such areas as drug 
enforcement, Coast Guard, border patrol, police, fire, disaster relief, and medical 
transport. 
Offshore Oil/ Resource Development 
Cargo/Package Express- Package express service continues to grow. However, 
operations are beginning to experience difficulty in getting packages from the 
pickup point to departure airports because of the ground congestion. [Ref.1] 
The market that possesses the greatest potential is the short-haul commercial 
passenger market. World demand estimates for CTRs range from 1085 - 1450. [Ref.13] 
Demand is considered high predominantly for two interrelated reasons. First, it is now more 
common for people to fly, and most are flying relatively short distances. As a result, the 
country is experiencing major problems with the current and future capacity of our 
commercial aviation transportation system. [Refs.1, 41, 43 and 44] This is not a unique 
American problem. Many countries in Europe and also Japan face similar capacity dilemmas. 
Second, the tiltrotor is envisioned to be most advantageous in the range within which, 
the current short-haul carriers, shown to be the root cause of the congestion problem operate. 
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The tiltrotor's solution to such congestion lies in its ability to eliminate the use of airports all 
together for a majority of short -haul traffic. A network or series of vertiports would be used. 
[Refs.1, 41, 43 and 44] 
The world's only manufacturers with previous tiltrotor experience are Bell and Boeing 
ofthe U.S. Both have entered a partnership to produce a CTR by the year 2007. The Bell-
Boeing team maintains a slight lead over the remaining world competitors, who's only serious 
contenders include a consortium of three European countries, and in the past, the Japanese. 
Russia is a distant fourth, and unlikely competitive. [Ref 1 and 13] 
4. What are the barriers to commercial innovation of the tiltrotor concept? 
There are five barriers to commercial innovation of the tiltrotor. To varying degrees, 
all must be addressed in order to successfully field the CTR. Four barriers were identified in 
the tiltrotor market studies. Three of these same four barriers, were also identified in Chapter 
IT, as being historical in nature. The three are public acceptance, technical risks, and financial 
risks. [Refs.1, 2, 5 and 9] The fourth identified in the market research is the lack of a 
supporting tiltrotor infrastructure [Refs.1, 13, 41 and 44]. A fifth barrier, believed by many 
to be the most significant, is a systems integration problem [Ref 1]. 
Both the experts and the research agree that the most critical steps in overcoming 
these barriers, particularly the systems integration barrier, are the formation of public/private 
partnership led by the government, and the implementation of a technology demonstration 
program. [Refs. 1, 13, 41 and 44] 
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5. Has previous Defense involvement in tiltrotor research and development 
(other than the MV-22), had any influence in overcoming the barriers associated with 
the CTR, and if so, to what extent? 
Development ofthe Transcendental Model1-G began as early as 1945. Later, a great 
deal of the research surrounding this aircraft was accomplished under joint Army- Air Force 
sponsorship. First achieving free flight on 6 July 1954, it later accomplished a 70 percent 
conversion from the helicopter mode to the airplane mode. [Refs.23 and 24] 
The Bell :XV-3 proposal was a continuation of the Model 1-G tiltrotor. It was again 
sponsored by the Army and Air Force. Built in 1955, it was intended to provide design and 
test data for the development of follow-on tiltrotor aircraft. The :XV-3 made its first complete 
conversion from the helicopter mode to cruise flight on 17 December 1958. 
This accomplishment and further XV -3 testing established the tiltrotor concept as 
being technically feasible, though inherent technical problems with the tiltrotor technology still 
remained. [Refs.23, 24, 27, 28, 28, 29, 30 and 31] 
The :XV-15 was developed under a NASA/Army/Bell research program as a tiltrotor 
concept demonstrator. It accomplished its first free hover on 3 May 1977. The first in-flight 
full conversion was achieved on 24 July of that same year. The full conversion was significant 
in advancing the tiltrotor concept. [Ref.24] 
The :XV-15 was not intended for operational use. [Ref.34] However, in addition to 
serving as a technology demonstrator, the XV -15 provided a "link" between its predecessors, 
that had proven the tiltrotor concept feasible, and a potential production aircraft. The XV -15 
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contributed to gaining both operator and public acceptance of the tiltrotor concept through 
its guest-pilot program and flight demonstration tour. [Ref24] 
The three historical barriers addressed in Chapter II (public acceptance, technical risk, 
and financial risk) were influenced by the following three contributions: 
* 
* 
* 
Government leadership and funding of tiltrotor research and development. 
Proving the tiltrotor concept technically feasible. 
Providing tiltrotor technology demonstration. [Refs.24 and 28] 
These previous efforts had no influence in addressing the barriers effecting 
introduction of the helicopter into the short-haul passenger market [Refs.2 and 20]. 
6. Will Defense development efforts involving the MV -22 help influence any of 
the barriers associated with the CTR, and if so, to what extent? 
If the civil tiltrotor follows the classic progression that other new and innovative 
aviation concepts have, then it will likely be developed only after several years of MV -22 
operational experience. [Ref 1] As discussed in Chapter II, the belief that the military must 
serve as the proving grounds for new aviation concepts is not new. [Refs.1, 2, 5, 12, 13, 19, 
44 and 45] 
It is believed that the Osprey may contribute to proving the tiltrotor concept by 
demonstrated success [Ref44]. Through operational flying, potential operators gain valuable 
general knowledge, as well as operational, reliability, maintainability, and safety data [Ref45]. 
This information is deemed critical in order to judge whether a commercial derivative of the 
123 
tiltrotor has the potential for economic viability [Ref. I]. Above all, operational experience 
helps reduce the uncertainties for potential civil users [Ref.1]. MV -22 aircraft are expected 
to have accumulated approximately 60,000 flight hours, two years prior to the projected CTR 
production start [Ref 13]. 
As of yet, no representative CTR prototype exists. The four CTR market studies, 
agency representatives, and individual experts, all recommend that the CTR be preceded by 
a interim technology demonstration program using the MV -22, in either its military 
configuration, or a highly modified civilianized version. The demonstration program is 
viewed as essential in order to gain community acceptance, particularly in the areas of noise 
and safety. [Refs.1, 13, 41 and 45] 
Several commercially unique technological advances were mentioned as not being 
addressed by gaining operational experience in the MV -22. They include external and internal 
noise reduction. [Ref 13] The researcher however, believes that these commercial advances 
can be mitigated to varying degrees, through development of the MV-22. 
It is believed that a MV-22 demonstration program will also aid infrastructure 
development, by enabling the establishment of a start-up network of vertiports. This will 
minimize initial investment, while still demonstrating how a CTR system can work. [Ref.13] 
7. Are there any other benefits that potential CTR applications are gaining, or 
likely to gain from Defense development and procurement of the MV-22? 
No commercial aircraft has used more composites than the MV-22 [Ref.41]. More 
significant, is its associated innovative composites manufacturing process, called fiber 
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placement [Ref.49]. CTR manufacturers are certain to exploit this advance, should a final 
management decision select composite technology over aluminum [Ref.13]. 
The MV-22 is the first major aircraft program to use computer aided design in it.s 
entirety. [Ref.2] The program makes use of Computer-Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive 
Application (CATIA) [Ref.13]. CTR development would most likely use this technology in 
its design as well. 
Substantial redesign of the V -22 redundant digital fly-by-wire flight control system 
is not believed to be necessary. However, the MV -22 system operates without a mechanical 
backup, and FAA certification has generally required this capability. [Ref.44] 
The MV-22 is needed to validate noise profiles for larger commercial tiltrotors. Noise 
associated with the MV-22 during the landing phase is considerable. This is primarily due to 
its three-bladed rotor design. Research and development of noise reduction technology 
includes the development of a four or five-bladed rotor system, as opposed to the three-
bladed system used on the MV-22. External noise reduction is a critical CTR design 
consideration. [Refs.13 and 44] 
Operational techniques to reduce noise levels can also be employed. A CTR can 
approach a vertiport at much steeper angles of decent, than can a turboprop. Preliminary 
tests indicate the optimal CTR glidepath is somewhere in the vicinity of9 to 12 degrees for 
the tiltrotor, as opposed to 3 for a turboprop. This can have a significant impact in decreasing 
external noise levels through standard arrival procedures. [Refs.l3 and 44] The FAA is 
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heavily involved in this area. There is hope that some of this work may eventually involve the 
MV-22. [Ref49] 
MV -22 development can provide relatively little technology transfer in the area of 
internal noise reduction [Ref 13]. However, the Osprey provides a baseline from which to 
engineer design improvements in the CTR [Ref 41]. 
There are several options for providing an aircraft with FAA one engine inoperative 
(OEI) capability. One way to achieve this capability is to design-in excess shaft horsepower 
(SHP) in the engines. This is not considered cost effective, considering the added weight, fuel 
consumption, and operating costs. The second option is based on the fact that turbine engines 
can be operated beyond their normal limits for short periods oftime. The MV-22, like most 
military aircraft, has contingency power capability that takes advantage of this second option. 
The CTRDAC recommends that the CTR should use an OEI contingency design similar to 
theMV-22. [Ref13] 
Assuming that U.S. manufacturers maintain their seven to ten year lead over world 
competitors, CTRs being produced in this country could lead to a segment of the world's 
aviation industry, being dominated by the U.S. [Ref2] 
It is estimated that perhaps as much as 1,000 companies will eventually be involved 
in the development and production ofthe MV-22. Many ofthe same companies involved in 
MV -22 production, will likely be involved in the production of civil derivatives. [Re£2] 
Development and production of the Osprey will create a demand for workers with 
new skills, some unique to the tiltrotor technology. Depending on market demand, CTR sales 
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could indirectly generate 100,000 to 300,000 jobs over the course ofthe CTR's production 
period. [Ref2] 
An additional economic benefit from MV -22 production, according to Colonel 
Garner, will be gained by the manufacturers. Revenue generated by the Osprey, will be used 
to defray the costs ofCTR development. [Ref47] 
C. SIGNIFICANT LESSONS LEARNED 
1. The CTR Employs Unique Commercial Systems 
It ts apparent that there is a substantial difference between military tiltrotor 
specifications, and commercial requirements. The CTR's dependence on the MV -22 is 
therefore, far more dependent on "technology transfer," as opposed to systems or hardware 
transfer. 
2. Infrastructure is More Critical Than MV-22 
Failure to produce the MV-22 will not eliminate the CTR's arrival, only slow it. 
Tiltrotor technology and corporate knowledge have progressed to the point where a CTR 
program can sustain itself Without a favorable production decision, the pre-production MV-
22 prototypes will still serve as technology demonstrators. What will be missing is the 
valuable operational and maintenance data that would be gained from operational experience. 
However, trying to entice commercial carriers to invest in literally thousands of 
tiltrotor aircraft without the advantage of supporting infrastructure, is like asking potential 
carriers of90 years past, to invest in aircraft that require hard-surface, 10,000 foot runways, 
when none existed. 
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3. The CTR Should Not Compete With Fixed-Wing Commuters 
There is no advantage in competing the CTR head-to-head with fixed-wing 
commuters. There is conflicting data concerning the ability to keep control of operating 
costs. It may be possible to a minimize fuel consumption by optimizing the CTR's flight 
profile. For example, being able to depart form vertiports in the STOL mode may reduce fuel 
consumption by over 50%. Additionally, the CTR's maintenance costs are higher. Most 
significant, if these factors hold true, it will require as much as a 25% to 50% premium on 
airfares. Operated in the same environment as the fixed-wing commuter (airport to airport) 
the CTR offers the customer no advantage, with higher airfares. 
In order to be profitable, the CTR must be operated in a manner that permits full 
exploitation of its unique capability. The tiltrotor's real advantage lies in its ability to 
eliminate the use of airports all together. The tiltrotor is both more efficient and effective in 
accomplishing intra-city travel as compared to inter-model transportation methods. Market 
studies show travelers to have a value for time savings and convenience, thus permitting 
premium airfares. 
D. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The barriers associated with the lack of supporting infrastructure and systems 
integration were similarly experienced during attempts to introduce the helicopter into the 
short-haul commercial passenger market. In the case ofthe helicopter, those attempts failed. 
Further study and analysis as to how these barriers might be overcome in the case of the CTR, 
could derive significant benefits for the nation's air transportation system. 
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APPENDIX A. TILTROTOR CHRONOLOGY AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 
TRANSCENDENTAL AIRCRAFT CO. FORlvffiD 1945 
TRANSCENDENTAL AWARDED AIR FORCE CONTRACT 1951 
TRANSCENDENTAL MODEL 1-G FIRST FLIGHT 6 JUL 1954 
TRANSCENDENTAL MODEL 1-G CRASHES INTO 20 JUL 1955 
DELAWARE. NC HAD ATTAINED 70% CONVERSION XV-31ST 
ROLLOUT UNDER ARMY I AIR FORCE CONTRACT 10 FEB 1955 
XV-3 FIRST FLIGHT 11 AUG 1955 
XV-3 CRASH OCT 1955? 
XV-3 FIRST FULL CONVERSION 17 DEC 1958 
XV -15 CONTRACT AWARDED 1972 
XV-15 FIRST ROLLOUT A/C#l 22 OCT 1976 
XV-15 FIRST FLIGHT 3 MAY 1977 
XV-15 A/C#2 ROLLOUT JUL 1978 
XV-15 FIRST FULL CONVERSION 24 JUL 1978 
JVX PROGRAM MANAGER ASSIGNED JUN 1981 
JVXMILESTONE 0 31 DEC 1981 
XV-15 LANDING AT U.S. CAPITAL 25 APR 1992 
ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE SIGN MOU DESIGNATING JUN 1982 
ARMY AS EXECUTIVE SERVICE FOR JVX JVX MILESTONE 8 DEC 1982 
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NX PRELIMINARY DESIGN CONTRACT AWARDED 
ARMY WITHDRAWS FROM JVX PROGRAM 
MARINE CORPS DESIGNATED EXECUTIVE SERVICE JVX 
DESIGNATED V-22 OSPREY 
V-22 JSOR APPROVED 
V -22 MILESTONE II 
V-22 FSD CONTRACT AWARD (FPIF) 
V-22 ENGINE DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT AWARDED 
TO ALLISON 
PHASE I TIL TROTOR STUDY COMPLETED 
CTR INDUSTRIAL BASE IMP ACT STUDY COMPLETED 
V-22 OSPREY ROLLOUT AT BELL 
V-22 ENGINE PRODUCTION CONTRACT AWARDED 
V-22 NC#1 FIRST FLIGHT IN HELO MODE 
SECDEF CANCELS V -22 PROGRAM 
NAVY RECLAMA 
CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION REINSTATES PROGRAM 
V-22 NC#2 FIRST FLIGHT 
V-22 FIRST FULL CONVERSION NC#l 
V -22 FIRST FLIGHT NC#4 
V-22 FIRST FLIGHT NC#3 
V-22 SHIPBOARD COMPATIBILITY TESTS 
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APR 1983 
MAY 1983 
JAN 1985 
APR 1985 
1 MAY 1986 
2 MAY 1986 
MAY 1986 
JUL 1987 
APR 1988 
23 MAY 1988 
JAN 1989 
19MAR 1989 
19 APR 1989 
APR 1989 
APR 1989 
9 AUG 1989 
14 SEP 1989 
21 DEC 1989 
8 MAY 1990 
4-7 DEC 1990 
PHASE II TILTROTOR STUDY CO:MPLETED 
V-22 FIRST MISHAP A/C#5 ON T/0 WILMINGTON, DEL 
V-22 SECOND MISHAP A/C#4 ON ARRIVAL QUANTICO, VA, 
FLIGHT TESTS TERMINATED 
SECDEF PROPOSES NEW VERSION OF V -22 PROGRAM 
SECNA V APPROVES NEW EMD 
CONGRESS DIRECTS FORMATION OF CTRDAC 
V -22 AIRFRAME EMD CONTRACT AWARDED 
V-22 ENGINE EMD CONTRACT AWARDED 
V -22 GROUND TESTS RESUME 
V-22 FLIGHT TESTS RESUME 
TILTROTOR EUROSTUDY EXECSUM COMPLETED 
V-22 JROC 
V -22 MILESTONE II PLUS (DAB REVIEW) 
V-22 ADM 
CTRDAC REPORT TO CONGRESS COMPLETED 
V-22 LRIP #I APPROVED 
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FEB 1991 
11 JUN 1991 
20 JUN 1992 
flJL 1992 
SEP 1992 
OCT 1992 
22 OCT 1992 
DEC 1992 
JAN 1993 
APR 1993 
1994 
AUG 1994 
13 SEP 1994 
10 FEB 1995 
DEC 1995 
7 FEB 1996 
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF CTR MARKET STUDIES 
1. Civil Tiltrotor Missions and Applications - Phase I 
National Issues 
* MV -22 technology addresses several national issues: 
1. U.S. prominence in tiltrotor technology. 
2. Airport congestion relief 
3. Technical and industrial competitiveness. 
4. Balance oftrade. 
Market Summary 
* The civil tiltrotor has large market potential, particularly in the short-haul passenger 
market. 
* Tiltrotor is superior to multi-engine helicopters under most conditions: 
1. Twice the speed and longer range. 
2. Lower operating costs. 
3. Better community acceptance. 
4. Better passenger comfort. 
* Tiltrotor is competitive with fixed-wing aircraft under certain conditions: 
1. VTOL capability and time savings are key to success. 
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2. Greater convenience could result in capture ofup to two thirds of short-
haul markets. 
* Market penetration depends on aircraft configuration, economics and size. 
Assessment is difficult. Will require: 
1. 300-1400 all new, unique civil designs. 
2. 50-700 MV -22 derivatives with some civil modifications. 
*Primary market is in North America (65%-75%). 
Technical Summary 
* Six configurations analyzed from 8 to 75 passenger capacity: 
1. Includes MV -22 derivatives and all new designs. 
2. All designs based on MV -22 technology. 
* MV-22 derivatives with pressurized fuselages can accommodate 50 passengers and 
meet range objectives of 600 nautical miles (NM). 
* Passenger and community acceptance is anticipated. 
* Tiltrotors can operate in current airspace; however improvements are needed to 
exploit tiltrotor capabilities. 
*Early development of aircraft certification criteria is a priority. [Ref41] 
Potential Barriers and Issues: 
*Technical validation. 
1. Composite fuselage. 
2. Pressurized cabin. 
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3. Aerodynamic improvement. 
4. High performance configurations. 
* Certification validation. 
* Infrastructure. 
1. Vertiport design, location, availability. 
2. Adaptation into National Aviation System. 
* Operational characteristics. 
1. Route proving. 
* Marketing. 
1. Public perception and acceptance. 
2. Safety. 
3. Economic competitiveness. 
4. Development of supporting infrastructure. [Ref. 41] 
Recommendations: 
Civil Tiltrotor Technology Development 
* Reduce risks and costs through design concepts, materials, and production methods. 
* Optimize aerodynamics and configurations. 
* Validate key technologies. 
1. Canard configuration. 
2. Pressurized composite configuration. 
3. Rotor/wing interaction. 
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Infrastructure Planning and Development 
* Vertiports conveniently located in metropolitan areas. 
* New terminal instrument procedures to take advantage of precision navigation 
equipment. 
* Integration into the National Aerospace System. 
* Certification criteria for powered lift. 
1. Continued development of airworthiness criteria. 
Flight Technology Demonstration Plan 
* Identify key technologies. 
* Identify vehicle candidates. 
* Support certification criteria 
* Define relationship to infrastructure needs. 
* Develop financial options and schedule. 
Near-Term Actions 
* Continue FAA/NASA/DOD/Industry cooperation for civil tiltrotor development. 
1. Follow-on work on civil tiltrotor technology development. 
2. Work on infrastructure and flight demonstration development plans. 
*Key civil tiltrotor development to MV-22 program. [Ref41] 
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2. Civil Tiltrotor Missions and Applications Phase II 
Findings: 
National Issues 
* Commercial tiltrotors could ease congestion and extend the useful life of existing 
airports. 
1. Increase airport capacity by freeing runways and approach slots. 
2. Network ofvertiports could divert short-haul travelers away from airports 
all together. 
3. Postpone or eliminate need for airport expansion. 
Market Summary 
* Strong potential in short-haul market. 
1. Tiltrotor is economically competitive. 
2. Half of commercial service is under 500 nm. 
3. By the year 2000 could create global demand for more than 2600 aircraft. 
Half would be in exports. 
Technical Summary 
* A commercial tiltrotor is technically feasible. 
1. Market responsive aircraft can be built. 
2. Aircraft could be made available by the year 2000. 
3. Tum-of-century commercial variant would be based on research and 
experience gained in designing, building, testing, and producing the 
military MV-22. [Ref44] 
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Potential Barriers and Issues: 
* Technology. 
1. Validation for commercial applications. 
2. Actual aircraft development. 
* Aircraft alone not sufficient. Need air/ground infrastructure. 
1. Adaptation of air traffic control system. 
2. Creation ofvertiport network. 
* Operators/Travelers demand technology be proven: 
1. Safe. 
2. Efficient. 
3. Environmental impact. 
4. Human factors-based pilot considerations. 
* National Acknowledgment. 
1. Endorsement as solution to congestion problem. 
2. National leadership [Ref.44] 
Recommendations: (Specific Actions) 
General 
*Formation of public-private partnership to pursue national tiltrotor plan. 
* Department of Transportation to lead. 
* Continue NASA/FAA/Industry cooperation. 
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NASA 
* Develop commercial tiltrotor technology based on: 
1. Environmental constraints. 
2. Pilot-aircraft interface. 
3. Vertiport Terminal Area Procedures. (VERTAPS) 
* Sponsor Technology Demonstration Program using: 
1. MV-22. 
2. Upgraded XV-15. 
3. Simulators. 
* Risk and cost reduction through: 
1. Improved materials. 
2. Improved design. 
3. Research to optimize technology for civil requirements. 
* Develop operational standards for: 
1. Community noise. 
2. Pilot-aircraft interface. 
3. Develop VERTAPS. 
*Ensure National Airspace System enroute handling capability. 
*Advocate and support Technology Demonstration Program. 
* Provide initial, key, vertiport study grants. 
143 
*Expedite acquisition ofMV-22 engineering test data. [Ref.44] 
3. "Eurostudy"; A European Regional Transportation Study. 
Findin&s: 
Regional Issues 
* Europe's transportation infrastructure is overloaded. 
1. Road, rail, and air, all suffer from congestion. 
2. For aviation, improvements in ATC can increase enroute efficiency. 
3. No Airport congestion solution as ofyet. 
4. Environmental concerns and political process slow potential solutions. 
Market Summary 
* Potentially substantial demand. 
1. Market for 116 cities studied. Potential ranges from minor to substantial. 
2. Highly fare sensitive. Tradeoff between cost and value for time savings. 
3. Location ofvertiports defines success. 
* Can compliment European rail market. 
*Non-conventional markets (not currently served by European air or rail could add 
to demand. 
* Increased air access for many communities. 
Technical Summary 
* Tiltrotor system is technically feasible. 
1. Military MY -22 provides technology base. 
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* Infrastructure components need to precede or accompany aircraft development. 
* Required number of aircraft dependent on fare competitiveness relative to 
conventional air travel. 
1. 1226 CTRs required by year 2010 for even fares. 
2. Only 420 required at 25% premium. [Ref.45] 
Potential Barriers or Issues: 
* Required infrastructure action is a political issue. 
1. U.S. manufacturers are limited in ability to suggest European leadership. 
* Paradigm shift in Europe. 
1. Heavy reliance belief in rail system. 
*Civil acceptance awaits military operational experience. 
1. MV -22 as technology base. 
2. Safety. 
3. Reliability [Ref.45] 
Recommendations: 
* Industry and European Government cooperation. 
*A demonstration program may be needed. [Ref.45] 
4. Civil Tiltrotor Development Advisory Committee (CTRDAC); Report to Congress. 
Findings: 
National Issues 
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* CTR could produce significant societal benefits. 
1. Reduce airport congestion. 
2. Create jobs. 
3. Positive impact on balance of trade. 
Market Summary 
* A CTR system could be economically viable under certain assumptions. 
1. Profitable without Government subsidies in heavily traveled corridors. 
2. Significant numbers of travelers have a value for time savings and 
convenience; willing to pay a premium. 
3. V ertiport location is critical success factor. 
Technical Summary 
* CTR is technically feasible. Industry production dependent on: 
1. Additional research and development. 
2. Infrastructure planning. [Ref.l3] 
Potential Barriers and Issues: 
*Public/User (carriers) Acceptance 
1. Aircraft noise levels. 
2. Safety, Reliability. 
3. Demonstration aircraft/program 
4. Adequate level of infrastructure support 
* Technical Risks 
1. Aircraft noise levels. 
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2. Aircraft certification 
3. Technology validation 
* Financial Risks 
1. High capital and operating costs in order to meet certification and 
regulations. 
2. Manufacturing costs based on anticipated efficiencies. 
3. Tiltrotor airfares in comparison to conventional airfares and competitive 
response. 
4. Start-up costs due to certification, training, operational break-in 
inefficiencies. 
5. Variability in demand forecasting. 
6. Variation in rider utilization due to business travel fluctuation. 
7. Estimated break even total sales low risk as compared to world-wide 
market demand. 
8. Compound risks could jeopardize system implementation. 
* Infrastructure 
1. V ertiport siting is critical. 
2. Vertiport availability. 
3. Requires demonstration aircraft/program. 
4. Delays effect potential investment. 
* Systems Integration 
1. No one agency controls the resources necessary for CTR system 
development. 
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2. Decisions to manufacture CTRs, develop air/ground infrastructure, and 
operate services are interdependent. [Ref.l3] 
Recommendations: 
* Creation of public/private partnership to coordinate all issues pertaining to 
CTR transportation system. 
1. FAA take lead in coordinating activities. 
2. Establish overall plan. 
3. Minimize capital expenditures until production commitment. 
4. Conduct periodic re-evaluation of plan. 
* Demonstration program for the purposes of: 
1. Assess community/operator acceptance. 
2. Assess environmental impacts. 
3. Gain operational experience. 
* Develop vertiport network study for one promising region. 
1. Include local government. 
2. Begin preliminary planning and site identification for vertiports. 
3. Conduct travel demand analysis 
* Proceed with an integrated, 10 year, CTR aircraft and infrastructure program. 
(research, development, test, and demonstration) 
1. Cost sharing of $600 million research and development between 
Government and industry. 
2. A milestone process to account for program prognosis, capable of 
acceleration or termination as warranted. 
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* Tiltrotor specific research complete by 2003 related to: 
1. Low-noise rotor design. 
2. Operational flight procedures to reduce noise. 
3. Development of metrics and tools for assessing noise levels and 
community acceptance. 
4. Contingency power demands on engine and transmission. (single engine 
operations) 
5. Power-off control and landing capability. 
6. Tiltrotor unique systems monitoring capability. 
7. Flight deck human factors design. 
8. Rotorwash and wake vortex assessment. 
9. Internal aircraft noise. 
* General aeronautical research of importance to the CTR: 
1. Composites, and in particular, manufacturing techniques. 
2. Icing prevention/removal systems. 
3. Fly-by-wire technology; failure modes and certification. 
* $28 million in infrastructure specific research complete by 2003. 
1. CTR ATC procedures. 
2. Designing and implementing vertiport area airspace. 
3. CTR Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS). 
* Continue and accelerate work on regulatory and certification issues. 
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* Department of Transportation (DOT) should conduct study of multi-modal 
operations to increase intercity transport capacity. 
1. Include CTR transportation system as contributing option in analysis. 
* Flight test program for the purpose of: 
1. Verify noise reduction efforts. [Ref.l3] 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED 
I. Mr. Steve Barlage, Manager, Civil Tiltrotor Business Development, Helicopters 
Division, Boeing Defense & Space Group, Interview by phone, 29 September 1995. 
2. Dr. John Zuk, Civil Tiltrotor Program Office, Code APT, NASA Ames Research 
Center, Interview, 20 October 1995. 
3. Mr. Steve Fisher, FAA Representative, Vertical Flight Terminal Area Procedures 
(VERTAPS), Interview by phone, 12 January 1996. 
4. Colonel Bob Gamer, Program Manager, MV-22 Program, PMA-275, Naval Air Systems 
Command (NA V AJR}, Interview by phone, 19 January 1996. 
5. Brigadier General Robert Magnus, USMC, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, 
Code AP, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and Member, CTR Development Advisory 
Committee, Interview by phone, 26 January 1996. 
6. Mr. Tom Archer, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA}, Rotorcraft Certification 
Directorate, Interview by phone, 26 January 1996. 
7. Representative Pete Geren, Democrat, Texas, Interview by phone, 9 February 1996. 
8. Representative Curt Weldon, Democrat, Pennsylvania, Interview by phone, 21 March 
1996. 
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